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An estimated 33 million  people are today infected with HIV. The majority of  these 
people live in developing countries, and many in countries experiencing armed conflict 
or  instability.  This  paper  examines  the  linkages  between  HIV/AIDS,  conflict  and 
national security applying existing theories to the Colombian context and asking whether 
HIV/AIDS  should  be  securitized  in  order  to  reduce  the  negative  cause  and  effect 
relationship. It finds that the linkages are definitely present in Colombia and concludes 




Aproximadamente 33 millones personas están  hoy en día infectadas con el VIH. La 
mayoría de ellos viven en países en vía de desarrollo y muchos de estos países están 
sufriendo conflictos armados o inestabilidades políticas. En el presente documento se 
examina  los  vínculos  entre  VIH/SIDA,  conflicto  y  seguridad  nacional,  aplicando  las 
teorías existentes al contexto colombiano y haciendo la pregunta si se debería tratar el 
VIH/SIDA como una cuestión de seguridad nacional para reducir la relación causa y 
efecto negativa. En el documento se descubre que estos vínculos están presentes en 
Colombia y concluye que a nivel nacional se debería buscar un reconocimiento político 
del tema VIH/SIDA, mientras a nivel internacional sería pertinente tratarlo como una 
cuestión de seguridad. 
                                                           
* This is a revised and shorter version of the Master Thesis 10p/15 ECTS. NOHA – Network Of Humanitarian Assistance. Masters programme 
Department of Peace and Conflict. Uppsala Universitetet.  Supervisor: Kjell-Åke Nordquist. October 2007. 
** Consultant. carolinetornqvist@yahoo.co.uk.  I would like to thank Professor Kjell-Åke Nordquist for his support and recommendations, as well as the 
people  interviewed  from  the  following  organisations  and  institutions:  Cerac,  La  Fundación  Seguridad  y  Democracia,  the  Government  Collective 
Demobilization  Programme,  the  Organisation  for  International  Migration,  the  Ministry  of  Defence,  the  National  Police,  the  Presidential  High 
Commission for the Social and Economic Integration of ex-combatants, the Organisation of American States, and the World Health Organisation, 
UNFPA and UNAIDS for their contribution to the analysis.  





An estimated 33 million people are today infected with 
HIV. The majority of these people live in developing countries, 
and  many  in  countries  experiencing  conflict  or  instability, 
including post conflict settings. The international community is 
increasingly  recognising  the  affect  HIV/AIDS  can  have  on 
national  security  and  conflict,  both  exacerbating  conflict  and 
being an obstacle to peace. Security Council Resolution 1308 
reflects  this  recognition.  The  purpose  of  the  paper  is  to 
investigate the value of including HIV/AIDS as a securitized 
concept in conflict resolution and the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.  The  research  question  it  poses  to  answer  this  is: 
“Should  HIV/AIDS  be  securitized?  If  so,  what  would  be  the 
consequences for humanitarian assistance?” Colombia is used as a case 
study. The paper approaches national security from the narrow 
definition  whilst  applying  the  discursive  reasoning  from  the 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies. Within this framework 
four main theories have been concluded on the links between 
HIV/AIDS,  national  security  and  conflict.  These  are  1) 
Uniformed personnel as a vector of HIV, 2) National security 
threatened  by  HIV/AIDS  affected  state  institutions,  3) 
Increased vulnerability to HIV infection in conflict and post-
conflict  environments,  and  4)  HIV  as  an  obstacle  to  peace 
building.  These  four  theories  are  explored  in  the  Colombian 
context. Colombia is a pertinent country to look at given that it 
has experienced a protracted internal conflict lasting over 40 
years, which has still not been resolved. Its HIV epidemic is 
characterised as concentrated and prevalence rate is comparably 
low. However prevalence is increasing, especially amongst the 
vulnerable population, pointing to the importance of targeted 
interventions in order to prevent a generalised epidemic. The 
interpretations of the Colombian conflict and the national and 
international  response  to  the  conflict  (both  political  and 
humanitarian) both have an impact on the HIV epidemic. Of 
the  four  theories  investigated  it  was  found  that  ‘uniformed 
personnel as a vector of HIV’ and ‘increased vulnerability to 
HIV infection in conflict environments’ presented the strongest 
linkages  between  HIV/AIDS,  national  security  and  conflict. 
The  theories  ‘national  security  threatened  by  HIV/AIDS 
affected  state  institutions’  and  ‘HIV  as  an  obstacle  to  peace 
building’ were less strong, mainly due to the relatively low HIV 
prevalence  rate  in  Colombia.  The  provision  of  humanitarian 
assistance in this context also impacts on the HIV epidemic and 
resultantly on the conflict. The illegal armed groups party to the 
Colombian conflict play an important role in the spread of HIV 
and as such must be targeted in any intervention to reduce HIV 
transmission. However the policies of the Uribe government do 
not  permit  this.  The  question  of  response  is  of  utmost 
important when answering the question on whether HIV/AIDS 
should be securitized. The paper argues for the securitization of 
HIV/AIDS  at  international  level,  though  concludes  that 
politicisation  of  the  issue  would  be  more  appropriate  in  the 
Colombian context. 
 
Research question: Should HIV/AIDS be securitized? If 
so,  what  would  be  the  consequences  for  humanitarian  assistance?  A 
Colombian case study  
 
Purpose:  To  investigate  the  value  of  including 
HIV/AIDS as a securitized concept in conflict resolution and 
the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
 
Reason: The magnitude of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
 
Based  on:  The  growing  body  of  evidence  linking 
HIV/AIDS  and  national  security  and  conflict,  and  the 
international commitments and resolutions made on the issue in 
recent years. 
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1.   ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AIDS  Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome 
ARV    Anti-retroviral  
AUC    Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration 
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo  
ELN    Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
FARC  Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
Colombia  
FFAA  Fuerzas Armadas (the Colombian 
Nacional Army) 
HIV    Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
ICG    International Crisis Group 
IDP    Internally Displaced Person 
IOM  International Organisation for 
Migration 
MDG    Millennium Development Goals 
NGO    Non-governmental organisation 
OAS-MAPP  Organisation of American States – 
the Mission to Support the Peace 
Process in Colombia 
PLWHA    People Living With HIV/AIDS 
STI    Sexually Transmitted Infection 
UNAIDS  Joint United Nations Programme on 
AIDS 
UNDPKO  United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operation 
UNFPA    United Nations Population Fund 
UNGASS  United Nations General Assembly 
Special Session on HIV/AIDS 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees 
VCT    Voluntary Counselling and Testing 
WHO    World Health Organisation 
2.  DEFINITIONS 
 
AIDS  -  Acquired  Immunodeficiency  Syndrome.  The 
later stage of a continuum of HIV infection and disease. The 
interval between HIV infection and AIDS varies. 
Armed  Conflict  –  contested  incompatibility  which 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force  between  2  parties,  of  which  at  least  one  is  the 
government, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year. 
Complex  emergency  –  a  humanitarian  crisis  where  a 
significant breakdown of authority has resulted from internal or 
external  conflict,  requiring  an  international  response  that 
extends beyond the mandate of one single agency. 
Concentrated epidemic - an HIV epidemic in a country in 
which  5%  or  more  of  individuals  in  groups  with  high-risk 
behaviour,  but  less  than  5%  of  women  attending  urban 
antenatal clinics, are infected. 
Emergency – a situation that threatens the life and well-
being of large numbers  of a population, extraordinary action 
being required to ensure the survival, care and protection of 
those  affected.  Emergencies  include  natural  crisis  such  as 
hurricanes,  droughts,  earthquakes  and  floods,  as  well  as 
situations of armed conflict 
Generalised  epidemic  -  an  HIV  epidemic  in  a  country  in 
which 5% or more of women attending urban antenatal clinics 
are infected. Infection rates amongst individuals in groups with 
high-risk behaviour are also likely to exceed 5% in countries 
with a generalised HIV epidemic. 
HIV-  Human  Immunodeficiency  Virus.  A  virus 
attacking the cells that are part of the body’s immune system. 
By weakening the body’s defence against diseases HIV makes 
the body vulnerable to a number of potentially life-threatening 
infections. 
HIV  prevalence  –  the  proportion  of  people  living  with 
HIV in a defined area or amongst a defined population group.  
Human  security-    developed  by  the  UNDP  in  its  2004 
Human  Development  Report,  which  increases  the  scope  of 
global security to include threats in 7 areas: economic security, 
food security, health security, environmental security, personal 
security, community security, and political security. 
Opportunistic  infections  –  an  infection  that  affect  people 
with low immune system 
Pandemic  –  an  epidemic  occurring  simultaneously  in 
many different countries 
War – armed conflict which results in at least 1000 battle 
related deaths per year  
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3.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since first detected in 1981 HIV/AIDS has infected 65 
million  people  worldwide  and  killed  more  than  25  million. 
Every day the pandemic kills three times as many people  as 
those who died during the September 11 terrorist attacks and in 
the decades ahead HIV/AIDS is expected to kill ten times more 
people than conflict1. HIV/AIDS has been declared as one of 
the  greatest  threats  to  development  and  poverty  reduction. 
Almost all countries in the world have committed themselves to 
stop and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS by the year 2015 
through the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) at the UN Millennium Development Summit in 2000. 
World leaders went further in their commitment to the fight 
against HIV/AIDS when at the UN General Assembly Special 
Session  on  HIV/AIDS  (UNGASS)  in  2001  189  countries 
declared HIV/AIDS a national and international development 
issue of the highest priority. UNGASS also took the progressive 
step  of  considering  HIV/AIDS  as  a  threat  to  international 
security, like the UN Security Council had done in Resolution 
1308 the year before. In passing Resolution 1308 the Security 
Council  recognised  that  the  HIV/AIDS  pandemic  is 
exacerbated  by  conditions  of  violence  and  instability  and 
stressed  that,  if  unchecked,  may  pose  a  risk  to  stability  and 
security.  Since  the  adoption  of  Security  Council  Resolution 
1308  a  number  of  regional  and  sub-regional  initiatives  on 
HIV/AIDS  and  security  has  been  established,  such  as  the 
African  Union  Peace  and  Security  Commission,  the  Pacific 
Regional Police HIV/AIDS Initiative, the Latin American and 
Caribbean  Armed  Forces  and  Police  Forces  Committee  for 
AIDS Prevention and Control (COPRECOS), to name just a 
few.  Research  increasingly  points  to  the  link  between 
HIV/AIDS, national security and conflict, demonstrating how 
conflict accelerates the spread of HIV and how HIV/AIDS in 
itself is a potential threat to national security.  
Based on the above developments the following research 
question  was  developed–  “Should  HIV/AIDS  be  securitized? 
And if so, what would be the consequences for humanitarian 
assistance?” Colombia is used as a specific case study, applying 
the  stated  links  between  HIV/AIDS  and  conflict  to  the 
Colombian  context.  Colombia  is  a  relevant  case  due  to  its 
protracted conflict and comparatively low HIV prevalence rate. 
It is of particular value for two reasons. First, the majority of 
existing  research  is  based  on  evidence  from  conflict-affected 
African  countries,  which  suffer  from  much  higher  HIV 
prevalence rates. Secondly, Colombia is also an example of an 
internal conflict, which is the most common type of conflict. 
The  findings  are  therefore  relevant  for  other  countries 
experiencing  internal  conflict  and  with  low  to  medium  high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. 
The paper is based on the narrow definition of national 
security and does not therefore examine the links between the 
demographic and economic threats to national security caused 
by HIV/AIDS. Whilst these links are also likely to be important 
they  have  been  excluded  in  order  to  permit  more 
comprehensive and qualitative research on the theories which 
are of direct relevance to national security based on the narrow 
definition.  Likewise,  there  are  many  other  factors  that 
contribute to an increased HIV/AIDS epidemic independent of 
the existence of armed conflict. If HIV/AIDS was to be taken 
into account in conflict resolution processes and integrated into 
the  Disarmament,  Demobilisation  and  Reintegration  (DDR) 
programmes,  such  factors  would  also  need  to  be  taken  into 
account. These factors are crucial for fully understanding the 
causes and affects of an HIV/AIDS epidemic in a country. 
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PART I: THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
4.  SECURITY DISCUSSION 
 
The  paper  in  exploring  the  link  between  HIV/AIDS, 
national  security  and  conflict,  approaches  security  from  the 
narrow perspective but in recognition of the shortcomings of 
the  narrow  definition  adopts  the  theory  developed  by  the 
Copenhagen School on Security Studies. This theory explores 
the logic of security and how an issue becomes securitized. Its 
main authors are Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Weaver 
and it is considered one of the most controversial contributions 
to the field of security studies in recent years.  
The narrow definition of security limits security to that of 
military security, and military conflict is the key denominator to 
security. Security therefore is determined by studying the threat, 
use  and  control  of  military  force.  The  military-political 
understanding of security is that of survival, with international 
security firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics. An 
issue becomes a matter of international security when survival is 
threatened.  This  happens  when  an  issue  poses  an  existential 
threat to a designated referent object, which most often is a 
state (consisting  of a government, territory and society).  The 
invocation of security is key to legitimise the use of force and 
justify the use of extraordinary measures by the state. As argued 
by  the  Copenhagen  theory,  by  saying  “security”  the  state 
representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming 
the  right  to  use  whatever  means  necessary  to  block  the 
threatening  development.  The  wide  definition  of  security  also 
takes into account other non-militarised sources of threats, such 
as economic, environmental and social issues. It is a response to 
the  growing  dissatisfaction  with  the  focus  on  military  issues 
only in the light of the increased importance of economic and 
environmental agendas in international relations in  the 1970s 
and 1980s, and issues of identity and cross-border crime in the 
1990s. The wide definition of security has been criticised for 
endangering the intellectual coherence of security by including 
such a range  of issues that the essential meaning  of security 
becomes void. The Copenhagen theory proposes a solution to 
this debate which is to keep the security agenda open to many 
different  types  of  threats,  and  to  seek  coherence  not  by 
confining security only to the military sector but exploring the 
logic of security itself. 
The  cornerstone  of  the  Copenhagen  School  security 
concept  is  the  importance  it  places  on  the  utilisation  of  the 
concept by governments and policy makers, and its discourse. It 
argues that “the use of the security label does not merely reflect 
whether a problem is a security problem, it is also a political 
choice,  that  is,  a  decision  for  conceptualisation  in  a  special 
way.”2  The  way  issues  end  upon  the  international  security 
agenda  is  through  speculative  predictions  about  future 
developments, prioritising between competing claims, and also 
deciding  whether  an  issue  is  best  addressed  under  a  security 
framework  rather  than  under  other  competing  frameworks. 
This is particularly so when the discussion refers to wider social 
issues where considerable elements of politics are involved in its 
determination and presentation in the public debate. They warn 
against the danger of securitization as basically security should 
be seen as negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal 
politics  which  ideally  should  be  able  to  unfold  according  to 
routine  procedures  without  such  extraordinary  elevation  of 
specific threats. The theory gives three options on how an issue 
is determined, depending on how it is presented in the public 
debate. It remains non-politicised if the issue is not put forward 
to  the  public  debate  or  discussion.  Alternatively,  it  becomes 
politicised when it is made part of public policy and subject to a 
public discussion. Finally, it becomes securitized if presented as 
an  existential  threat  requiring  emergency  measures  and 
justifying  actions  outside  the  normal  bounds  of  the  political 
procedures.  
For an issue to become securitized it must be taken out 
of its non-politicised or politicised status and elevated to the 
security sphere by being presented according to the particular 
logic of the security speech act. The security speech act has four 
components through which the issue must  pass: i) securitizing 
actors (such as political leaders, intelligence experts etc) declaring 
ii) a referent object (such as a state) to be iii) existentially threatened 
(e.g. by an imminent invasion), and who make a persuasive call 
for the adoption of iv) emergency measures to counteract this threat 
(e.g. declare war or impose a curfew)3. The theory seeks to ask 
with some force the value in presenting an issue as a security 
issue, and to enable an analysis to determine whether the issue 
is better dealt within normal politics. 
 
5.  BACKGROUND 
  
5.1  A  Growing  Recognition  of  the  Link 
between HIV/AIDS, National Security and Conflict 
In  the  first  two  decades  since  the  discovery  of 
HIV/AIDS the disease was conceptualised primarily as a public 
health and development issue. A small number of analysts in 
the US CIA and some other think tanks sporadically explored 
the linkage between HIV/AIDS and security in the 1990s. The 
major international turning point was in the year 2000 when the 
issue  was  for  the  first  time  discussed  at  the  UN  Security 
Council,  which  declared  HIV/AIDS  in  Africa  a  threat  to 
international peace and security. The same year the US National 
Security  Council  formed  an  inter-agency  working  group  and 
pronounced  HIV/AIDS  a  security  danger.  For  US 
development practitioners this has meant that support for HIV 
prevention  can  also  be  given  to  military  institutions.  This  is 
justified by the fact that soldiers in many developing countries 
have been flagged as a population with very high levels of HIV, 
and  ignoring  them  would  compromise  civilian  HIV/AIDS 
initiatives. Further UN Security Council Resolution has since 
been issued on HIV/AIDS and security, such as S/Res/1325  
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on  “Women,  Peace  and  Security”,  A/Res/S-26/s  and 
A/Res/60/262 which establish targets and strategies to reduce 
the  spread  and  impact  of  HIV.  They  call  for  HIV/AIDS 
components  to  be  included  in  international  assistance 
programmes  in  crisis  situations  and  for  member  states  to 
establish strategies to address HIV among national uniformed 
services.  Since  2001  UNAIDS  together  with  the  US 
Department of Defence has been chairing the international task 
force  for  strengthening  and  co-ordinating  implementation  of 
AIDS  strategies  among  uniformed  services  worldwide.  With 
close co-operation with the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNDPKO) AIDS prevention has been integrated 
into the pre-deployment training of UN peacekeepers and there 
are AIDS Advisors Focal Points in all 18 peacekeeping missions 
worldwide. In 2004 a UN Inter-Agency Working Group was 
established  to  develop  clear  and  practical  policies,  guidelines 
and  procedures  for  the  planning,  implementation  and 
monitoring of HIV/AIDS in DDR programmes.  
 
5.2  The HIV/AIDS Pandemic 
In the coming decade HIV/AIDS is expected to kill ten 
times more people than conflict. According to UNAIDS Global 
Epidemic  Report  2006  11,000  people  are  infected  with  HIV 
every day and  8,000  people  die  from  HIV/AIDS  on  a  daily 
basis. HIV/AIDS is clearly a health issue, but its far-reaching 
impact  makes  it  a  development  problem  threatening  human 
welfare, socio-economic development and productivity,  social 
cohesion and national and international security. In 2001 the 
Special  Session  of  the  UNGASS  declared  HIV/AIDS  as  a 
national and international development issue of highest priority 
and the resulting Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS 
called  for  innovative  responses,  co-ordinated  efforts  and 
accountability  for  progress  against  the  epidemic.  The  World 
Bank estimates that per capita growth in half of the countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa is falling by 0.5%-1.2% each year as a direct 
result of AIDS, and by 2010 per capita GDP in some of the 
hardest hit countries may drop by 8%. The sheer number of 
people  infected  has  overburdened  national  health  systems, 
social systems and hinders educational development, placing an 
extremely  high  financial  cost  on  countries  while  at  the  same 
time depleting human resources. When infection rates among 
adults reach 5% the spread of the disease will accelerate at a 
much  faster  rate,  and  thus  become  increasingly  difficult  to 
control. In 2001 25 countries had infection rates of more than 
5%.4 
In 2007 an estimated 33 million people were living with 
HIV/AIDS  worldwide  and  2.2  million  became  infected.  The 
same year AIDS caused 2 million deaths. In the last 25 years 25 
million people have died of HIV/AIDS.5 95% of people living 
with  HIV/AIDS  (PLWHA)  live  in  developing  countries,  of 
which  nearly  two-thirds  in  sub-Saharan  Africa.  AIDS  is  the 
leading cause of death in Africa and the fourth leading cause 
worldwide. More than 15 million children under the age of 15 
have been orphaned by HIV/AIDS, with the number projected 
to double by 2010.6 The Caribbean is the second worst affected 
region in the world, where the HIV prevalence rate averages 
2.3%7. It is the leading cause of deaths amongst adults aged 
between 15 and 44 years. Eastern Europe and Central Asia is 
experiencing one of the fasted growing HIV/AIDS epidemics, 
with the number of PLWHA increasing 20-fold in less then 10 
years. Asia being home to almost half of the world’s population 
will determine the scope of the future HIV/AIDS pandemic. If 
prevalence rates in China, Indonesia and India increase to 1% 
the number of people infected with HIV/AIDS globally will 
double.8 
Groups  identified  as  being  most  vulnerable  to 
HIV/AIDS include young people (in particularly young girls), 
women, homosexuals, men-having-sex-with-men, sex workers, 
displaced populations and uniformed personnel. Vulnerability is 
influenced by a number of variables, and the interactions and 
relationships between them, including:  
initial infection rates 
patterns of sexual behaviour  
the frequency of rape 
infectivity and viral load 
the presence of sexually transmitted infections (STIs)  
age, and in particular the age of female partners  
the presence or absence of economic or social pressures 
on women to be sexually active 
the extent to which condoms are  available, affordable  
and socio-culturally acceptable 
whether the male partner is circumcised  
service  and  programme  factors  such  as  the  cultural 
appropriateness  (or  inappropriateness)  of  HIV/AIDS 
prevention  programmes;  the  accessibility  (or 
inaccessibility) of services due to distance, cost and other 
factors, and the capacity of health systems to respond to 
growing demand 
  
5.3  HIV/AIDS as a security issue  
Applying the Copenhagen School securitization theory 
to  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the  UN  Security  Council 
HIV/AIDS it can be argued that HIV/AIDS has already been 
securitized.  As  demonstrated  by  Elbe,  arguments  around 
HIV/AIDS “have shifted from humanitarian and public health 
ones to officials in international organisations, governments and 
NGOs (securitizing actors) increasingly arguing that beyond these 
humanitarian considerations, the survival of communities, states 
and  militaries  (referring  objects)  is  now  being  undermined 
(existentially threatened), unless drastic measures (emergency measures) 
are  undertaken  by  national  and  international  actors  to  better 
address the global pandemic.”9  
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Whilst the increased attention given to HIV/AIDS by 
world leaders is arguably welcomed, there are certain dangers in 
making HIV/AIDS a security issue. It could potentially push 
national  and  international  responses  away  from  civil  society 
towards  state  institutions  such  as  the  military  and  the 
intelligence  community,  which  have  the  power  to  override 
human  rights  and  civil  liberties.  Of  greater  concern  are  the 
consequences of the “threat-defence” logic part of the security 
language. Viewing HIV/AIDS as a security threat would push 
the response to be based on narrower national interests rather 
than  as  a  global  multidimensional  problem,  and  thus  risk 
adverting  international  efforts  made  in  countering  the 
HIV/AIDS  pandemic.  As  pointed  out  by  Susan  Peterson, 
responding  to  HIV/AIDS  as  a  security  issue  transforms  the 
logic  of  international  action  into  one  of  narrow  self-interest. 
This can create the impression that global health issues are only 
worth addressing if they touch upon the core security interests 
of  states  and  may  end  up  absolving  states  from  any  moral 
responsibility to react to a disease in the developing world that 
do not engage their essential national interests. Portraying the 
disease as a security threat can also reverse the advances made 
by  grassroots  AIDS  activists  to  normalise  social  perceptions 
regarding PLWHA. Finally, it allows states to prioritise AIDS 
funding  for  their  armed  forces  and  elite.  Securitizing 
HIV/AIDS therefore risks removing the issue from being dealt 
with through routine democratic procedures to less democratic 
and  transparent  echelons  of  state  power,  and  shifts  the 
responses  from  civil  society  to  military  and  intelligence 
organisations.  It  places  HIV/AIDS  within  a  state-centric 
framework,  where  states  are  primarily  concerned  with 
maximising  power  and  security  rather  than  addressing  wider 
humanitarian  concerns.  On  the  other  hand,  securitizing 
HIV/AIDS brings with it a number of benefits, such as focus, 
attention and mobilisation of resources to fight the pandemic. 
In many of the countries most affected by HIV/AIDS it is not 
excessive state mobilisation that poses the main problem, rather 
the utter absence of a meaningful state response to the disease. 
The approach taken by the UN Security Council is an attempt 
to  increase  political  pressure  on  governments  to  address  the 
issue in a way that would help ensure the survival of millions of 
PLWHA.  The  ability  of  states  to  override  certain  legal 
provisions is also an advantage in the struggle to weaken the 
grip of patents on life-saving medicines, as such patents could 
potentially  be  overridden  in  the  light  of  national  security 
considerations.  Art  73(b)  of  TRIPS  notes  that  nothing 
contained in the agreement should be construed to prevent a 
member from taking any action which it considers necessary for 
the  protection  of  its  essential  security  interests.  In  terms  of 
normalising HIV/AIDS to reduce stigma and discrimination, as 
pointed  out  by  Elbe  “there  is  a  crucial  difference  between 
arguing that people with HIV/AIDS are a security threat and 
arguing that AIDS is a security threat.”10  
Efforts to fight the pandemic are unlikely to succeed if 
they do not involve the security sector. However, as argued by 
Elbe,  HIV/AIDS  should  be  presented  as  a  security  issue  in 
addition to also being a health issue, development -, economic -, 
social-, political-, and gender issue, etc. It should be framed as 
an issue with important security dimensions, rather than as a 
dangerous  and  overwhelming  security  threat.  Such  issues  are 
included in the broader framework of human security. 
 
6.  THEORIES  LINKING 
HIV/AIDS,  NATIONAL  SECURITY, 
CONFLICT 
 
The  body  of  evidence  linking  HIV/AIDS,  national 
security  and  conflict  can  be  grouped  into  four  different 
categories:  1)  uniformed  personnel  as  a  vector  of  HIV;  2) 
national  security  threatened  by  HIV/AIDS  affected  state 
institutions;  3)  increased  vulnerability  to  HIV  infection  in 
conflict  and  post-conflict  environments;  and  4)  obstacles  to 
peace building. The theories are strongly interlinked and will as 
such inevitably overlap.  
 
6.1  Uniformed personnel as a vector of HIV 
Uniformed  services  include  national  militaries,  police 
forces and international peacekeepers. This group, which are at 
the forefront of maintaining national and international stability, 
is  particularly  affected  by  HIV/AIDS.  Uniformed  personnel 
have a heightened vulnerability to infection, as well as acting as 
an agent for spreading HIV within the communities where they 
serve and live.  
Military  personnel  have  an  elevated  risk  of  HIV 
infection  compared  to  the  surrounding  civilian  population. 
Research  show  that  uniformed  services  personnel  display  an 
HIV  infection  rate  on  average  2-3  times  higher  than  the 
comparable  civilian  population11.  For  example,  Southern 
African military authorities have reported HIV prevalence rates 
of  20-40%  and  even  as  much  as  50-60%.  STI  rates,  which 
greatly increase the risk of HIV infection, are generally 2 – 5 
times  higher  among  armed  forces.  In  times  of  conflict  the 
difference can  be  up  to  50  times  higher12.  According  to  the 
World  Bank  countries  with  big  armies  have  higher  HIV 
prevalence rates13. For the average developing country, reducing 
the  size  of  the  military  from  30%  to  12%  of  the  urban 
population will reduce seroprevalence among urban adults by 
4%.  
The  military  is  considered  one  of  the  three  core 
transmission  groups  of  HIV/AIDS,  alongside  sex-  and 
transport  workers14.  A  number  of  factors  making  men  and 
women  in  uniformed  services  particularly  vulnerable  to  HIV 
infection include:  
Age – Most personnel are within the age group 15-24, 
which is the group at greatest risk for HIV infection.  
Postings  –  the  posting  of  personnel  far  from  their 
accustomed  communities  and  families  for  varying  periods  of 
time  has  been  identified  as  the  single  most  important  factor  
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leading  to  high  HIV  rates  in  the  military15.  As  well  as  the 
emotional  stress  placed  on  the  individual,  this  practice  also 
encourages use of commercial sex as soldiers are removed from 
traditional  social  controls  and  spouses  or  regular  sexual 
partners.  
Attitudes  and  behaviour  –  attitudes,  either  purposely 
indoctrinated by the armed forces or learnt informally as part of 
military  ‘culture’  encouraged  through  peer  pressure,  include 
willingness  to  accept  risk  and  aggressiveness.  This  has  been 
found to lead to increased willingness to engage in high-risk 
sexual practice, such as unprotected and/or purchased sex, and 
an increased likelihood to have multiple partners. The fact that 
soldiers have a steady income often make them considerably 
better off than those in surrounding communities, encouraging 
the growth of sex industries around military settings. The sense 
of prestige of being part of the services, reinforced by bonding 
within units, has encouraged soldiers to view civilians (especially 
women)  as  people  over  who  power  can  be  exerted,  with 
increased  incidents  of  coercive  sex.  Rape  by  soldiers  is 
systematic  in  some  conflict-affected  countries  such  as  DRC, 
where  60%  of  the  armed  forces  are  estimated  to  be  HIV 
positive. The sharing of razors and skin piercing instruments 
used  in  tattooing  and  scarification  are  additional  high-risk 




In Namibia and Zambia AIDS related illnesses are now 
the  leading  causes  of  death  in  the  army  and  police  forces, 
accounting for more than 50% of in-service and post-service 
mortalities16. In badly affected countries AIDS patients occupy 
75% of military hospital beds and the disease is responsible for 
more admissions than battlefield injuries17.  
Africa’s first national HIV/AIDS epidemic occurred in 
Uganda and coincided with a foreign invasion (Tanzania) after 
which  followed  a  gruesome  civil  war.  It  is  believed  that 
Ugandan and Tanzanian militaries provided a bridge population 
whereby  a  concentrated  epidemic  was  spread  to  the  general 
population. The spread of HIV in Uganda has been linked to 
the  movement  and  especially  the  demobilisation  of  armed 
forces.  
A KAP survey by the UN among peacekeepers deployed 
to Liberia which showed that approximately 25% had sexual 
intercourse  within  the  mission  area,  31%  had  2  or  more 
partners, and 21% reported not using condoms despite their 
availability 
Other  studies  on  sexual  behaviour  of  uniformed 
personnel  include:  a  study  of  Dutch  sailors  and  marines  on 
peacekeeping  duty  in  Cambodia  which  found  that  45%  had 
sexual contact with sex workers or other members of the local 
population;  findings  that  10%  of  US  naval  personnel  and 
marines contracted a new STI during trips to South America, 
West Africa and the Mediterranean during 1989-9118; and that 
increased  infection  rates  were  reported  among  Nigerian 
peacekeepers  returning  from  deployment  in  neighbouring 
countries. 
 
6.2  National  Security  threatened  by 
HIV/AIDS affected State Institutions 
HIV/AIDS has the greatest impact on national security 
when  combined  with  and/or  exacerbating  other  factors  that 
threaten livelihood, and can in this way lead to the erosion of 
the state’s law and order and welfare functions. Applying the 
narrow  security  definition,  the  state  which  consists  of  a 
government, territory and society, is the main agent exposed to 
security  threats.  Its  survival  becomes  threatened  when  key 
government institutions which make the state run and resolve 
disputes peacefully cease to function. Competing powers may 
take advantage of the resultant security vacuum in order to seize 
power.   
 
Reduced functioning of national militaries 
As  the  threat,  use  and  control  of  military  force  is  a 
central  matter  pertaining  national  security,  the  impact  of 
HIV/AIDS is of particular concern for national security when 
affecting the national military. As seen, the military is one of the 
most vulnerable groups to HIV infection. HIV/AIDS seriously 
impedes  the  operational  functioning  and  readiness  of  the 
military  reducing  combat  effectiveness  and  deployment  of 
troops. Sick leave and leave to care for dependants have led to 
increase absenteeism, to the point that some commanders from 
high prevalence countries worry about being able to field a full 
contingent for deployment on relatively short notice. According 
to public statements in Malawi, troop strengths have decreased 
by 40% due to AIDS related deaths19. In South Africa it was 
found that up to 50% of soldiers aged 23-29 were HIV positive 
in  1999,  raising  immense  human  resource  challenges.  In  all 
likelihood there will be a shortage of qualified and experienced 
personnel and a  hollowing  out of the institution, since most 
soldiers infected with HIV are expected to die before they reach 
the  age  of  35.  Additionally,  in  some  countries  demographic, 
health and socio-economic factors are already putting pressure 
on the pool of recruits, a situation exacerbated, or even caused 
by,  an  HIV  epidemic.  Even  if  new  recruits  can  be  found, 
readiness and smooth teamwork are compromised if absences 
are filled in by people who have not served together previously. 
The  impact  on  continuity  of  command,  as  well  as  loss  of 
cohesion,  disruption  of  schedules,  and  loss  of  respected 
personnel pose a serious threat to morale and discipline within 
national  militaries.  Quality  may  be  further  reduced  when 
younger  and  less  experienced  personnel  take  on  more 
responsibility and are brought in to replace infected personnel. 
A  weakened  national  military  is  per  se  a  risk  for  increasing 
instability inside a nation, and with its neighbours. 
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Reduced effectiveness of other key state institutions 
AIDS  poses  a  further  threat  to  national  security  by 
reducing  the  ability  of  the  state  to  govern,  i.e.  ensuring  the 
effective  operation  of  the  institutions  and  people.  With  the 
death  of  large  numbers  of  experienced  workers,  AIDS  is 
decimating civil services, police forces and national institutions, 
thus  posing  a  fundamental  threat  to  community  and  social 
cohesion. HIV/AIDS also has an adverse affect on a country’s 
attempt to establish or maintain democracy and equality as the 
next generation of political leaders is being wiped out.  
At  the  most  basic  level  HIV/AIDS  has  a  profound 
impact  on  national  policing.  In  South  Africa  HIV/AIDS 
reportedly permeates the police and military to such an extent 
that neither are permitted to donate blood. The Kenyan police 
said in year 2000 that AIDS accounted for 75% of all deaths 
reported in the force in the last two years20. Teachers and health 
care  workers  are  other  heavily  affected  sectors  of  public 
employment. UNESCO has estimated that Africa is expected to 
lose  10%  of  its  teachers  to  AIDS  by  2005,  setting  back 
education levels by 100 years. The World Bank has noted that 
as education levels drop, the standard of living follows, leaving 
people with less of a stake in the system, ultimately increasing 
the risk of violence21. These dynamics it has been argued can 
both  singularly  or  in  combination  exacerbate  and  in  some 
settings provoke social volatility and political polarisation. The 
increasing  inability  of  governments  to  respond  effectively  to 
HIV/AIDS contributes to instability in a restive citizenry. As 
pointed out by International Crisis Group (ICG) South Africa is 
a test case of how a perceived mishandling of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic  can  feed  internal  tensions  and  drain  political 
legitimacy.  AIDS  has  become  a  persistent  legal  and  political 
issue  in  South  Africa.  The  epidemic  is  creating  military 
uncertainty, splits in the ruling ANC, and deep disillusionment 
among  citizens  who  believe  their  government  has  failed  to 
provide for them. The AIDS crisis will add greater burdens to a 
society already struggling with economic and political reforms 
and persistent dangers of civil conflicts. Russia illustrates as an 
example  where  there  already  exists  widespread  public 
discontent with the hardships of transition and where relatively 
fragile  democratic  institutions  are  extraordinarily  poorly 
positioned to deal with a major health crisis.  
 
The creation of a security vacuum 
The impact of AIDS may as such intensify the struggle 
for  political  power  to  control  scarce  state  resources  and 
contribute  to  the  growth  and  attractiveness  of  extremist 
movements,  as  actors  attempt  to  fill  the  vacuum  left  by  the 
weakened state. As pointed out by ICG domestic and foreign 
sources of unrest (political, military or criminal) are likely to fill 
the vacuum left by weakened military and police forces. In weak 
states with divided societies, opposition groups may exploit the 
situation by instigating civil unrest or toppling the ruling elite. 
In some countries the military may themselves become a threat 
to law and order. Anything that weakens a state may create an 
environment in which a state poses outside aggressors a more 
tempting  target.  When  major  state  powers  are  weakened  the 
effect  is  less  likely  to  present  itself  as  invasion  and  war  but 
instead  increased  turbulence  and  minor  violence  in  the 
international system. The larger the country, the larger is the 
potentially destabilising impact on the international area. What 
happens  in  Russia,  India  and  China,  with  their  huge 
populations, large militaries and historic rivalries, matters a great 
deal elsewhere. Even the perception that a neighbour’s military 
is  suffering  from  an  AIDS  epidemic  may  trigger  wars,  and 
similar perceptions may trigger coups d’état at home. 
 
6.3.  Increased  vulnerability  to  HIV  infection  in 
conflict and post-conflict environments 
Conflict  zones  provide  ideal  conditions  for  the 
accelerated spread of HIV/AIDS, as most risk indicators for 
HIV  vulnerability  sharply  rise.  The  disruption  of  social 
structures, mass movements of people (armies and refugees), 
breakdown of healthcare infrastructure and increased poverty 
caused by conflict have often showed to cause greater casualties 
than military action, and are factors highly conducive to HIV 
infection. The nature of a conflict will significantly influence the 
likelihood of an epidemic. Short wars that depend on “distance” 
tactics  such  as  aerial  bombardment  are  less  likely  to  spread 
HIV/AIDS than conflicts that lead to long-term fighting on the 
ground  and  to  mass  movements  of  soldiers  and  civilians. 
Conflict also increases the number and power of two groups at 
the  highest  risk  of  contracting  HIV/AIDS:  soldiers  and  sex 
workers. UNAIDS reports that throughout North Africa and 
the Middle East HIV is spreading fastest in war torn Somalia 
and Sudan. Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar also have large 
epidemics and have all been affected by conflict. The damage to 
health  infrastructure  caused  by  conflict,  the  behaviour  of 
conflict affected populations, and the policies pursued during 
times of conflict have been identified to increase vulnerability to 
HIV infection. 
 
Damage to the health infrastructure 
Healthcare  infrastructure  is  repeatedly  attacked  in 
conflict  zones,  which  is  also  one  of  the  main  systems  to 
respond  to  an  HIV  epidemic.  This  creates  three  significant 
problems.  First,  demand  for  healthcare  services  increases 
substantially  as  war-casualties  increase  and  civilians  find 
themselves at increased vulnerability to violent (combat-related 
injury)  and  non-violent  (infectious  diseases)  health  problems. 
Secondly, the supply of healthcare services will rapidly contract 
as services are redirected to battlefield surgery and emergency 
medicine.22 Conflict-affected populations  often lack access to 
sexual  and  reproductive  health  services,  including  access  to 
antenatal  services,  voluntary  HIV  counselling  and  testing 
(VCT),  and  prevention  of  mother-to-child  transmission, 
denying  the  most  basic  protection  against  HIV.  In  addition, 
there is often an acute lack of ARV provision and treatment for 
opportunistic infections. During conflict there is an increased 
need for blood transfusions though there is often a shortage of  
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resources to screen the blood, thus increasing the risk of HIV 
transmission through infected blood. Lastly, the breakdown in 
monitoring and surveillance systems prevents accurate estimates 
of  HIV  prevalence  and  the  behaviour  of  the  epidemic,  thus 
preventing targeted high-impact interventions. 
 
Changed behaviour of conflict affected populations 
Conflict  and  militarization  tend  to  exacerbate  gender 
inequality.  This  manifest  itself  in  the  lowering  of  status  of 
women,  which  in  turn  reduces  their  ability  to  protect 
themselves  against  HIV,  either  through  the  fidelity  of  their 
partners or through condom use. Women often become reliant 
on  transactional  sex  as  their  lives  are  disrupted  and 
impoverished.  As  men’s  lives  become  disrupted  by  conflict, 
either through joining armies or migrating, new sexual relations 
are  facilitated.  Conflicts  are  also  associated  with  increases  in 
rapes, which on some occasions have been used as a weapon of 
war  and  genocide,  such  as  in  Rwanda.  Almost  all  female 
survivors  of  the  Rwandan  genocide  were  raped,  giving  rape 
epidemiological significance as a direct transmitter of HIV, as 
well as a cause of physical trauma leaving them considerably 
more  vulnerable  to  HIV  transmissions.  In  Bosnia  between 
30,000 and 40,000 women were raped and faced being infected 
and risk transmitting HIV to their partners and children23. The 
medical conditions arising from rape, such as internal bleeding 
and tearing of genitalia, make women further vulnerable to HIV 
infection.  The  acute  lack  of  HIV/AIDS  knowledge  in  many 
conflict situations is another main factor increasing vulnerability 
to  infection.  This  is  partly  caused  by  the  undermining  of 
awareness  raising  and  prevention  efforts,  and  partly  because 
even where awareness is high the daily realities of life under 
conflict can diminish the perceived risk of HIV infection. It has 
also  been  found  that  people  become  more  sexually  active 
during times of conflict as a result of increased uncertainty over 
the  future.  Lastly,  alcohol  and  drug  use  often  increase  as  a 
reaction  to  trauma,  and  with  it  lower  perceptions  of  HIV 
infection risk and behaviours change. The above factors have 
led  to  increased  rates  of  HIV  and  STIs  in  conflict 
environments.  
 
Refugees and IDPs 
Displacements  caused  by  conflict  place  people  at  a 
heightened risk for HIV infection, and refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) have been identified as a group highly 
vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. Refugee and IDP movements from 
high  prevalence  areas  to  low  prevalence  areas,  or  vice  versa, 
have  been  found  to  accelerate  increases  in  HIV  rates,  as 
refugees/IDPs  interact  with  the  host  populations  (in  many 
instances  as  a  mean  of  survival)  or  with  their  home 
communities on their return. A number of factors contribute to 
their vulnerability, including uprooting and movement, poverty 
and lack medical services or the inability of existing services to 
cope  with  the  additional  increase  in  demand.  Refugees  and 
IDPs  are  also  particularly  vulnerable  to  sexual  violence  and 
exploitation.  Adequately monitoring and surveying  the  health 
situation,  including  HIV  prevalence,  amongst  displaced 
populations  is  extremely  difficult  due  to  relocation,  loss  of 
medical records and the difficulty to access these populations. 
This  is  particularly  a  problem  amongst  non-camp  based 
refugees and IDPs.  
 
Wartime policies and priorities  
States  in  conflict  are  making  slow  progress  in 
implementing  plans  to  fight  HIV/AIDS.  Given  the  long 
incubation period of HIV, monitoring its spread has not been a 
priority under emergency conditions. The threat of HIV/AIDS 
is  widely  underestimated  in  conflict  affected  countries  and 
insufficient  national  resources  are  directed  at  tackling  the 
problem, with social services starved of funds which instead are 
redirected to armies and armament. In addition, the breakdown 
of  epidemiological  surveillance  caused  by  conflict  has 
devastating  effects  on  targeted  interventions.  International 
financing to fight HIV/AIDS is almost entirely absent from the 
countries most affected by conflict. 
 
The post-conflict environment 
The post conflict period is also a time of high societal 
vulnerability  to  HIV.  The  ending  of  conflict  often  leads  to 
substantial  population  movements,  reunification  of  families, 
opening of roads, increased flow of commerce, demobilisation 
of  combatants  and  deployment  of  peacekeepers  and  aid 
workers. This environment could provoke an explosive spread 
of  HIV.  As  evidenced  in  Cambodia  peacekeepers  have 
significant  physical,  moral  and  economic  power,  which 
frequently enables them to have sexual relations with locals and 
sex  workers,  either  consensually  such  as  commercial  sex  or 
through coercion. South Africa is another credible example as 
the early stage of the epidemic coincided with the opening of 
the country’s borders and the return of troops who had been 
staged in Namibia.  
 
6.4  Obstacle to Peace building  
High rates of HIV/AIDS have in some instances been 
found to be an obstacle to peace, creating disincentives to end 
conflicts. As members of the uniformed services international 
peacekeepers  are  particularly  vulnerable  to  HIV  infection  as 
well as acting as agents for transmission. This is beginning to 
impact on both states’ commitments to supply peacekeepers for 
international missions and acceptance to receive peacekeepers. 
Finally,  HIV/AIDS  can  have  a  detrimental  effect  on  post-
conflict recovery and reconstruction. 
 
HIV/AIDS as a disincentive to end conflict  
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HIV/AIDS can result in disincentives to end conflict. 
Where soldiers come from low prevalence countries they have 
often facilitated the spread of HIV in their home communities 
once  they  return  from  duty24.  Returning  combatants  act  as 
Trojan  horses  when  they  enter  a  low-prevalence  area  and 
transmit  the  virus  to  members  of  the  civilian  population 
surrounding  military  bases.  Some  analysts  have  reported  that 
one of the reasons for why the Rwandan Government has been 
slow  to  end  its  involvement  in  the  DRC  is  that  it  fears  the 
return  of  potentially  highly  infected  troops  will  increase 
HIV/AIDS  prevalence  rate  in  Rwanda.  On  the  other  hand 
military officials in the DRC and Nigeria have confirmed that 
high  rates  of  HIV/AIDS  encourage  risk  taking  and 
inappropriate behaviour among soldiers who believe they have 
already  received  a  death  sentence.  Soldiers  infected,  or 
expecting  to  become  so,  have  their  time  horizons  shortened 
dramatically  and  in  DRC  it  has  been  shown  that  they  will 
choose continued fighting, plunder and short-term enrichment 
over the prospect of peace.  
 
Reduced willingness by states to provide or receive peacekeepers 
HIV/AIDS  affects  peacekeeping  operations  both  in 
terms  of  a  country’s  willingness  to  contribute  troops  and  its 
willingness to receive international peacekeepers. The USA and 
South Africa are two countries that are becoming increasingly 
unwilling to contribute national contingents to high-risk zones. 
In 2000 the then US Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrook 
stated  that  in  the  future  the  US  will  never  again  vote  for  a 
peacekeeping  resolution  that  does  not  require  action  by  the 
UNDPKO to prevent AIDS from spreading to peacekeepers. 
India,  Pakistan  and  Bangladesh,  which  are  major  troop 
contributing countries and with low HIV prevalence rates, have 
expressed concern over the risk their troops face of contracting 
HIV while deployed abroad. An increased HIV prevalence rate 
amongst their troops would in turn have a negative impact on 
the operational functioning and readiness of their own national 
armies.  Peacekeepers  have  also  been  found  to  spread  HIV, 
particularly so in Cambodia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, with the 
result  that  countries  are  becoming  increasingly  unwilling  to 
accept  peacekeepers  from  high-prevalence  countries.  During 
the Balkans conflict of the 1990s, there was an effort by Zagreb 
to  keep  African  peacekeepers  out  of  Croatia  in  case  they 
became a vector of the HIV virus. South Africa’s Institute for 
Strategic Studies25 has warned that unless the spread of AIDS 
among African armies is stopped soon, it is possible that many 
countries, including South Africa, will be unable to participate 
in peacekeeping operations. This would be a serious blow for 
peacekeeping operations as soldiers from countries with high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence make up 11% of the UN force total, 
whilst countries nearing such high prevalence yield 37% of all 
UN peacekeepers.  
 
Obstacle to reconstruction and recovery of national security 
Post-conflict  reconstruction  and  recovery  in  countries 
with high HIV prevalence rates may also be further complicated 
by  the  epidemic.  Strengthening  governments  in  post-conflict 
societies  has  been  one  of  the  chief  preoccupations  of 
development  planners  for  decades.  The  burden  HIV/AIDS 
places  on  human  and  financial  resources  puts  institutions  of 
governance  under  threat  just  as  they  are  needed  the  most. 
Demobilising and reintegrating combatants may be threatened 
by combatants returning to villages and families heavily affected 
by the virus, and by breakdown of government, police and civil 
society  and  by  overall  AIDS-caused  economic  decline.  The 
space left behind by deteriorating national institutions can all 
too easily be  occupied by forces of destruction and conflict, 
either within the country with the rise of criminal activity and 
communal violence, or from outside as neighbouring states take 
the  advantage  of  a  state’s  weakness.  Failure  to  rebuild  and 
reintegrate post-conflict countries is a main cause for a relapse 
of violence and conflict. 
 
6.5  Critique against theories  
The  critique  towards  the  theories  linking  HIV/AIDS 
and conflict wishes to bring to the debate a critical view to the 
increasing  acceptance  of  the  link  between  HIV/AIDS  and 
national security by arguing that the loss of national security can 
act as decelerating factor. In a similar manner neither will the 
presence of high prevalence rates automatically pose a threat to 
national security.  
The main arguments presented against the linkages are: 
HIV rates in armies and uniformed services are highly 
variable,  in  some  instances  considerably  higher  than  in 
corresponding civilian populations, whilst in other the same or 
lower. In the early days of the African pandemic, several armies 
seemed to have very high rates. Now most armies seem to have 
rates comparable to or lower than the general population. In 
Asia  it  is  possible  that  the  rates  are  higher  than  the  low 
background rates in the population. This variability is also the 
case for peacekeepers. 
Fears  that  militaries  would  collapse  on  account  of 
HIV/AIDS  have  not  materialised.  There  is  strong  anecdotal 
evidence that at a very early stage of the east African pandemic 
some militaries were hard hit by the loss of officers to AIDS 
giving rise to fears that armies would be hollowed out by the 
disease. AIDS however cannot overtake a division or garrison 
in a matter of weeks, like influenza or malaria.  
Conflicts  can  at  times  protect  against  HIV/AIDS.  In 
some  prolonged  conflicts  in  Africa  HIV  prevalence  has 
remained relatively low compared to other countries that have 
not  been  affected  by  emergencies.  Investigations  in  Sierra 
Leone, DRC, Southern Sudan, Angola and northern Ethiopia 
fail to show increases in HIV. In northern Uganda HIV rates 
are higher than in the south, but appear to follow much the 
same patterns and trends.   
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The main conclusion therefore is to avoid a one-size-
fits-all  approach  as  the  reasons  will  be  different  in  different 
cases.  Alex  De  Waal  has  illustrated  this  by  arguing  that,  for 
example,  in  Angola  the  outbreak  of  war  pre-dated  the 
emergence  of  an  HIV  epidemic.  The  war  kept  the  national 
population isolated from its neighbours and should therefore 
not have had the effect of driving up HIV rates. In southern 
Sudan the ‘isolation’ argument may also hold true but this is not 
the case in the IDP camps in northern Uganda. The fact that 
camps are heavily policed and allow little privacy may mean that 
there  is  a  reduction  in  sexual  activity.  In  northern  Ethiopia 
drafted soldiers were mainly rural youth which in addition were 
screened for HIV. Moreover the army also had an unusually 
good HIV programme. This may explain why HIV prevalence 
did not significantly increase.  
In comparison with the body of research supporting the 
linkage  between  HIV/AIDS  and  conflict  the  above  critique, 
although  valid,  appears  rather  weak.  In  the  examples  given 
above, many organisations and researchers argue the opposite. 
For example, in Sierra Leone peacekeepers were found to be 
the main agents for spreading HIV/AIDS (claimed by amongst 
others the ICG, the CSIS and Save the Children) thus pointing 
to the risks posed by the post conflict environment. Save the 
Children has further concluded that rates are expected to be 
high and growing rapidly in conflict countries such as Angola, 
DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone, whilst UNAIDS say HIV is 
spreading  fastest  in  war  torn  Somalia  and  Sudan  out  of  all 
North  African  and  Middle  Eastern  countries.  UNAIDS  also 
reported that although it is believed that prevalence amongst 
new recruits to the Ethiopian army were lower than that of the 
civilian  population  due  to  the  exclusion  of  recruits  testing 
positive, infection rates are expected to increase with age and 
time  spent  in  service.26  The  CSIS  estimates  high  HIV 
prevalence rates within the Ethiopian army, partly as a result of 
the high prevalence rate amongst the general population.  
Whilst  it  is  arguably  important  to  recognise  the 
uniqueness of each conflict and to base any response (being 
HIV/AIDS or any other issue in resolving conflicts) on case-
specific  information  and  evidence,  it  is  equally  important  to 
recognise that different situations can lead to the same effects. 
For example, there may be many different reasons for why HIV 
infection  rates  are  higher  in  national  armies  than  in  the 
corresponding population, but as a result they act as a vector of 
HIV infection. Analysis on both sides conclude that the lack of 
reliant  surveillance  systems  to  monitor  HIV  prevalence 
accurately in conflict settings makes it impossible to know what 
the actual rates are in these countries and how fast the epidemic 
is accelerating.   
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PART II: CASE STUDY 
COLOMBIA 
 
7.  COLOMBIA 
 
7.1  The Colombian Conflict 
The origins of the 40 year long Colombian conflict can 
be  traced  back  to  the  period  called  “La  Violencia”,  between 
1948 and 1958 when a civil war raged between the conservative 
and  liberal  parties.  The  Armed  Revolutionary  Forces  of 
Colombia  (FARC)  was  formally  created  in  1966.  By  the  late 
1970s there were a dozen guerrilla groups active as well as the 
newly  formed  self-defence  groups,  which  were  the  private 
armies of rich landowners. For a period in the 1980s FARC 
observed  a  cease-fire  and  ran  candidates  for  political  office, 
though  it  returned  to  armed  opposition  following  the 
assassination of a number of leaders of its political party the 
Union  Patriota.  During  the  1980s  and  1990s  drug  trade  and 
kidnapping were lucrative business for the illegal armed groups. 
The  Colombia  United  Self-Defences  (AUC),  was  formed  in 
1995  as  an  umbrella  group  consisting  of  several  local 
paramilitary groups. The AUC referred itself as a special pro-
state  group.  When  Alvaro  Uribe  came  to  power  in  2002  he 
vowed to fight the illegal armed groups, both on the left and the 
right of the political spectra. A ceasefire was signed with the 
AUC  in  December  2002  and  in  2006  more  than  30,000 
paramilitaries  had  officially  demobilised,  which  caused  the 
government Peace Commissioner to declare that the AUC no 
longer existed. However violence continues, the demobilisation 
process has only been partly successful, and new illegal criminal 
groups continue to emerge. The impacts of the conflict have 
been profound. According to the Small Arms Survey 2006, over 
38.800 people have died as a direct consequence of the conflict 
since 1998, translating into 2,221 deaths per year. 
 
The direct actors to the Colombian conflict include:  
The Colombian Government and the National Armed 
Forces: according to government figures, the national military 
counts  with  254,259  troops27,  and  the  national  police  with 
136,23028. The government’s approach is a military defeat of the 
illegal armed groups, in particular FARC.  
FARC: a peasant based organisation though recruitment 
mainly  targets  unemployed  youth  in  rural  areas.  With  an 
estimated  16,000  to  20,000  members,  FARC  is  one  of  the 
largest guerrilla forces in the world29.  
ELN:  founded  by  academics  and  priest  taking 
inspiration from  the Cuban Revolution. It has approximately 
4000 to 6000 members30 though it has been hit hard by both 
the national armed forces and the paramilitaries.  
The  paramilitaries:  an  alliance  of  various  self-defence 
groups  united  as  the  AUC.  The  AUC  has  enjoyed  a  quasi-
legitimate status in some parts of the country, in particular in 
their  strongholds  of  Antioquia,  Córdoba  and  parts  of  the 
Caribbean  coast.  The  paramilitaries  began  as  an  anti-guerrilla 
federation but with the formation of the AUC they evolved into 
a drug federation in which traffickers from across the country 
used the paramilitary network to make deals, pool shipments 
and share routs.  
The USA: Colombia is of particular interest to the USA 
in  its  post-9/11  war  against  terrorism  policy,  which  makes 
direct  links  between  drug  trafficking  and  the  financing  of 
international terrorism. The primary aim of US policy towards 
Colombia is improving the state’s military capacity to combat 
the  illegal  armed  groups.  In  2006  US  military  support  to 
Colombia (Plan Colombia) was valued at $602.6 million31. 
Issues  pertaining  social  justice  were  of  main  concern 
when  FARC  and  ELN  were  formed,  though  the  quest  for 
economic  and  political  power  have  come  to  dominate  the 
motivations of the guerrilla groups in recent years. Both FARC 
and  ELN  state  that  they  want  to  overthrow  the  state.  The 
current government under Uribe has stated that there is no war 
or  armed  conflict  in  Colombia  instead  the  government  is 
engaged in a fight against terrorism. Uribe seek to align other 
governments in the region in the fight arguing that terrorism in 
Colombia is a potential threat to democracies throughout South 
America.  FLASCO  (the  Latin  American  Faculty  of  Social 
Science)  has  distinguished  four  threats  to  the  region  as  a 
consequence of the Colombian conflict: neighbouring countries 
risk the presence of armed actors of the Colombian conflict in 
their  territories;  a  humanitarian  crisis  and  social  conflict 
resulting from Colombian refugees; an ecological catastrophe 
due  to  the  effects  of  the  fumigation  policy  to  combat  coca 
cultivation; the spread of illegal crops to other Latin American 
countries32.  Ecuador,  Venezuela  and  Panama  have  expressed 
concern over the considerable number of Colombian refugees 
they  are  receiving,  and  the  presence  of  Colombian  armed 
groups in Brazil and Peru has been reported. The Democratic 
Security  Policy  of  the  Uribe  government  identifies  terrorism 
and drug-trafficking perpetrated by the narco-terrorist groups as 
significant threats to national security. The Policy describes the 
security  challenge  as  an  essentially  criminal  one  and  the 
government has assigned high priority to fight the emergence of 
new  illegal  armed  groups  following  the  AUC  demobilisation 
process. The government has stated that these new groups will 
not receive any kind of recognition, such as AUC did, but will 
be pursued as criminals. Nevertheless, the State’s presence in 
many  regions  is  still  precarious,  making  it  more  difficult  to 
control these groups. 
Successive  governments  have  attempted  several  DDR 
processes with the various rebel groups. Since 1990 some 7,300 
former  guerrilla  soldiers  have  disarmed  of  which  4,715  have 
entered reintegration programmes. The majority of paramilitary 
groups initiated a cease-fire with the government in December 
2002, although this was not always observed on the ground. By 
the  end  of  2006  some  32,000  ex-combatants  had  been 
demobilised33. The process however has been fiercely criticised,  
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in particular by human rights organisations for being initiated 
without  an  adequate  legal  framework  for  its  implementation, 
and  for  being  excessively  lenient  on  the  paramilitaries.  The 
process  has  also  failed  to  reintegrate  the  ex-combatants  into 
civil society in a sustainable manner. Many of the demobilised 
AUC  combatants  involved  in  the  new  armed  groups  joined 
because these groups offer more lucrative employment than the 
government stipend for the demobilised combatants. Both the 
ICG  and  the  Organisation  of  American  States’  Mission  to 
Support  the  Peace  Process  in  Colombia  (OAS-MAPP)  have 
reported an increase in the reorganisation of demobilised AUC 
combatants into new criminal gangs. There is a consensus that 
such micro-rearming could present a more difficult challenge to 
reintegration than the re-emergence of large armed groups.  
 
7.2  The HIV/AIDS Situation in Colombia 
The  HIV  pandemic  is  spreading  rapidly  in  Latin 
America and the Caribbean. New infections continue to linger 
around 140,000 per year and the number of AIDS deaths at 
around 65,000. Two thirds of all PLWHA live in the four most 
populous countries:  Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, 
whilst  HIV  prevalence  rates  are  the  highest  in  the  smaller 
Central American countries. Honduras has a prevalence rate of 
1.5%  and  Belize  2.5%  in  2005.  Transmission  of  HIV  in  the 
Latin American region occurs in a context similar to most of 
the  countries:  widespread  poverty  and  migration,  insufficient 
information on the epidemic trends outside major urban areas 
and  rampant  homophobia.  UNAIDS  has  concluded  that  the 
severe economic and social inequalities present in the majority 
of  Latin  American  countries  constitute  a  favourable 
environment for the rapid growth of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
the coming decades34.  
HIV prevalence rate in Colombia 2005 stood at 0.7% 
and is estimated to reach 1.5% in 201535. The majority of new 
infections 2000-2004 occurred amongst the age group 25-34, 
followed by the age group 35–44. Although there continues to 
be an underreporting of deaths from AIDS, AIDS mortality as 
a proportion of total mortality has risen from 0.86% in 1997 to 
1.22% in 2004.36 HIV/AIDS is considered a high-cost disease 
within the Colombian health system, in particular due to the 
high cost of ARV treatment. Access to services is greatly limited 
by the conflict, but also because of the high cost of services, 
long  waiting  periods,  minimum  payment  within  the 
contributory health scheme, geographical access etc. 
The dynamics of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Colombia 
can in many ways be explained by Colombian culture, which 
also  plays  a  vital  role  for  the  prevention  and  control  of  the 
epidemic. Fears, myths and taboos associated with sexuality and 
HIV/AIDS could play a part in the low request for VCT and 
the discrimination and exclusion towards PLWHA. Engaging in 
unprotected  sex  cannot  be  explained  only  by  lack  of  sexual 
education  or  condom  access,  it  also  has  to  do  with  beliefs, 
attitudes and practices integrated in Colombian society. Sexual 
education continues to be based on moralistic values and does 
not  offer  a  wider  understanding  of  sexuality.  Despite  an 
increase in condom promotion efforts, condom use remain low 
and sectors within society opposing the use of condoms still 
exercise strong influence amongst the Colombian population. 
Machismo, which has strong influence in Colombian society, 
further contributes to the spread of HIV as it condones or even 
promotes  high-risk  behaviour  such  as  zoophilia,  anal  sex 
between men, sexual initiation with sex workers amongst young 
men.  Sexual  and  domestic  violence,  closely  correlated  to 
machismo and which incidence has increased in the last 5 years, 
continue  to  be  an  important  factor  in  the  increase  in  HIV 
prevalence.  Poverty,  unemployment  and  forced  displacement 
have  lead  to  an  increase  in  commercial  sex.  Two  types  of 
commercial sex have been reported to be of particular concern 
by  UNAIDS.  Firstly,  sex  in  exchange  for  money  or  food  in 
conflict affected zones, areas with a high number of displaced 
people  and  in  communities  which  lack  opportunities  and 
capacities for income generating activities. Secondly, related to 
consumerism where sex is  offered in exchange for access  to 
social  benefits  and  services  such  as  clothes,  acquisition  of 
electrical  goods  or  payment  for  higher  education.  Of  the 
reported cases of HIV/AIDS in Colombia between the years 
1983 – 2005, 24% were in Bogota, 22% in Valle, followed by 
16%  in  Antioquia.  These  are  also  the  departments  that  first 
counted with a system of registration. Of the reported cases, 
40% pertained the age group 25-34, 25% the age group 35-44, 
and 18% 15-24 year olds.37 
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PART III: ANALYSIS & 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.  ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis is based on the interviews conducted in Colombia, 
supplemented by published materials. Some unpublished material has also 
been  used.  Only  published  material  that  can  be  traced  is  referenced. 
Interviews  were  conducted  with  the  Cerac  Foundation,  La  Fundación 
Seguridad  y  Democracia,  the  Government  Collective  Demobilization 
Programme, the Organisation for International Migration, the Ministry of 
Defence, the National Police, the Presidential High Commission for the 
Social and Economic Integration of ex-combatants, the Organisation of 
American  States,  UNAIDS,  UNFPA  and  the  World  Health 
Organisation,  
 
8.1  The Security Situation 
The intensity of the Colombian conflict has fluctuated 
and  has  at  times  been  elevated  to  the  status  of  civil  war  as 
battle-related deaths per year reached 1000 or above (as in 2001, 
2002, 2004 and 2005)38. The decision by the Uribe government 
not to classify the Colombian conflict as armed conflict or civil 
war has serious implications for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance and the response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
 
Interpretation of the Colombian conflict 
How a conflict is defined is crucial to the response from 
both  a  humanitarian  and  political  perspective,  and  will 
determine  whether  international  humanitarian  law  becomes 
applicable. In a clear break from his predecessors Uribe takes 
the view that there does not exist an armed conflict or civil war 
in Colombia. Instead the government interprets the conflict as a 
fight between the legitimate state and terrorist groups, placing 
the local challenges in the global war on terrorism framework 
advocated by the USA. Uribe supported the US invasion of Iraq 
and the subsequent sidelining international humanitarian law in 
his  quest  for  stronger  US  involvement  in  the  Colombian 
conflict and the continuation of Plan Colombia. Uribe went as 
far as asking  the USA  to  treat terrorism in Colombia in  the 
same manner as in Iraq, something which would very much run 
the  risk  of  foreign  invasion39.  The  Bush  administration 
recognises Colombia as a security problem but very much as a 
secondary  issue40.  There  is  some  inconsistency  in  the 
interpretation taken by the Colombian administration, with the 
police  and  military  defining  the  conflict  as  an  armed 
conflict/civil war, as well as inconsistency in the language and 
actions by president Uribe.  
 
Response 
The government policies emphasise military defeat over 
the guerrilla, the recuperation of state authority and monopoly 
of coercive force. By viewing the guerrilla and paramilitaries as 
terrorist  groups  the  government  has  prohibited  humanitarian 
organisations accessing these groups and has broken with the 
line  taken  by  the  Pastrana  government  when  the  guerrilla 
groups  participated  openly  in  peace  negotiations  with  the 
government.  In  assuming  the  presidency  in  2002  Uribe 
increased the military force and national defence expenditure, 
imposed a war tax and sought the direct involvement of the 
USA in the conflict. Uribe has called for a revision of the Pan-
American  Treaty  on  Reciprocal  Assistance  of  1947  for  it  to 
incorporate  threats  deriving  from  internal  situations  of  the 
countries  party  to  the  treaty  as  a  regional  threat.  Although 
denying the existence of an armed conflict/civil war the Uribe 
government  has  stated  that  the  war  cannot  be  won  with  the 
existing  institutional  guarantees  of  democratic,  civilian  and 
political rights in place. Such guarantees are seen as obstacles to 
winning  the  war  and  Uribe  has  openly  stated  that 
antidemocratic measures are required to defeat the illegal armed 
groups. 
 
Demobilisation of the paramilitaries 
By  the  end  of  2006  35,000  paramilitaries  had  gone 
through  the  demobilisation  process  and  as  a  result  the 
government  announced  that  the  paramilitary  no  longer  exist. 
This is in clear contrast to what is happening on the ground 
where violence and corruption by paramilitary or paramilitary-
style  groups  continue.  Whether  it  is  paramilitary  violence 
becomes  a  question  of  definition.  In  the  sense  that  the 
paramilitaries are the same as the AUC, it could be argued that 
they do no longer exist. Approximately 30 different paramilitary 
structures were merged to form AUC. This structure has now 
been demobilised, and all the ex-combatants are registered and 
identified. The problem lies in that many of the demobilised ex-
combatants have continued within different criminal structures, 
although with different motivations and purposes. Fighting the 
guerrilla is no longer their main aim, instead it is focused on 
drug trafficking, lottery, casinos, counterfeits etc. and as such it 
has become a public order problem rather than a military one. 
The new groups are much less structured, have no clear line of 
command, and operate in much smaller groups. In this aspect 
paramilitarism continues, though it raises the question whether 
or not this is as such paramilitarism. The UN concluded that 
that rather than  wresting control from the paramilitaries and 
restoring it to the state, demobilisation has been accompanied 
by “progressive penetration and control by paramilitaries over 
municipal and departmental administrations in various regions 
of the country, as well as over illicit economic activities.”41  
 
Implications on the provision of humanitarian assistance and the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic  
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Policies  being  pursued  under  the  cover  of  fighting 
terrorism may well be laying the groundwork for a worsening 
humanitarian  crisis.  A  significant  consequence  deriving  from 
classifying the Colombian conflict as a fight against terrorism is 
that it prevents application of international humanitarian law. A 
crisis  perceived  as  an  internal  armed  conflict  triggers  the 
provisions  of  international  humanitarian  law,  which  creates 
space  for  traditional  assistance  and  protection  activities  and 
opens  up  a  role  for  UN  facilitation  and  mediation.  By 
interpreting  the  conflict  as  terrorism  the  Colombian 
government is instead invoking the military and police powers 
of the state to maintain public order, whilst circumscribing the 
functioning  of  international  humanitarian  and  human  rights 
organisations.  It  also  prevents  these  organisations,  as  well  as 
other NGOs and agencies, to approach the illegal armed groups 
in  the  fight  against  HIV/AIDS.  State  provided  HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment services in the conflict affected areas 
are at best limited and in many instances non-existent. As such, 
humanitarian organisations, NGOs and other non-state actors 
play  an  important  role  in  providing  such  services  to  the 
Colombian  population  though  they  face  major  obstacles  in 
accessing the population. A further consequence of overriding 
human rights and civil liberties is that it denies the human rights 
of  PLWHA  and  other  minority  groups.  It  prevents  proper 
investigations into the crimes perpetrated by the illegal armed 
groups  against  these  groups,  including  the  assassination  of 
PLWHA.  Interviews  with  the  national  police  confirmed  that 
such  investigations  were  not  a  priority,  and  that  in  any  case 
there  does  not  exist  a  system  to  establish  the  proportion  of 
reported  crimes  collated  at  police  central  headquarter  which 
relates  to  breaches  of  human  rights  of  PLWHA  and  other 
minority groups. The approach also tacitly permits the state to 
commit  human  rights  abuses,  a  practice  which  has  been 
reported by many human rights organisations such as Human 
Rights Watch and the UN Committee Against Torture. Even 
where  cases  are  brought  before  the  national  judicial  system 
infiltration by the illegal armed groups into the legal system and 
the corruption of judges presents a serious obstacle to ensuring 
human rights.  
The war policies adopted by Uribe have led to increased 
fighting  and  destruction  on  the  ground.  Under  the  Uribe 
government  the  status  of  the  Colombian  conflict  has  been 
elevated to the level of civil war three times; in 2002, 2004 and 
2005. This impacts on the HIV/AIDS epidemic as it produces 
more battle related injuries which treatment requires the strict 
adoption  of  universal  precautions42  in  order  to  prevent  HIV 
transmission. Protocols on universal precautions are good but 
implementation in the rural conflict affected areas is believed to 
be inadequate at times. It also places a heavy burden on the 
national healthcare system, which is the main system to respond 
to HIV/AIDS.  
The increase in violence has prevented the repatriation 
of  IDPs  as  well  as  led  to  new  displacements.  The  United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 
that there are currently up to 3 million IDPs in Colombia and 
approximately  10%  of  the  Colombian  population  has  been 
displaced once or more by the conflict. An estimated half of the 
IDPs are children under the age of 18. IDPs are particularly 
vulnerable to HIV infection and transmission due to limited or 
no access to healthcare services and intimidation by the illegal 
armed groups to access HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment 
services  where  they  do  exist.  The  Representative  of  the  UN 
Secretary General for the Human Rights of IDPs reported after 
a visit to Colombia in 2006 that “Colombia is a country with 
commendable legislation and a far-reaching policy framework 
on internal displacement /…/ However, there is a clear gap 
affecting the human rights of many among the up to 3 million 
displaced  persons  between  what  the  law  says  and  what  is 
implemented at the regional and local level.”43  
As concluded by Minear “The picture of the Colombian 
state that emerges is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, the 
state  uses  its  authority  and  acts  forcefully  when  it  deems  it 
necessary.  On  the  other,  it  has  acknowledged  difficulties  in 
delivering essential human services and orchestrating effective 
relationships with the international community.”44 
 
8.2  Uniformed personnel as a vector of HIV  
This section considers the Armed Forces of Colombia 
(Las  Fuerzas  Armadas,  FFAA),  and  the  main  illegal  armed 
groups FARC and the AUC. The decision to include the illegal 
armed  groups  under  uniformed  personnel  is  due  to  the 
important role they play in the conflict, their considerable size 
and because they are structured and function in similar manners 
as a conventional army. It is therefore important to analyse their 
potential  role  as  a  vector  of  HIV  infection.  Analysis  on  the 
paramilitaries  is  based  on  the  force  as  it  was  up  until  the 
demobilisation process came to an end in late 2006. 
 
8.2.1  Las  Fuerzas  Armadas  –  the  Armed  Forces  of 
Colombia 
The FFAA includes the army, the air force, the navy and 
the  police.  They  currently  number  400,000  and  are  due  to 
increase, with the largest increase destined for the police force. 
The army has changed from being a predominantly conscript 
army  (although  military  service  is  still  obligatory)  to  one 
composed of mainly professional staff.  
 
Age  
The main age group within the police is 20 – 24 years 
old, followed by 25 – 29 years, of which the majority pertain to 
the  lower  to  middle  ranks.  The  main  age  group  within  the 
military is 19 – 24 year old. Since 1997 there have been 357 
reported  cases  of  HIV  within  the  police.  In  2007  (up  until 
August)  57  new  cases  were  reported.  The  majority  of  these 
cases are amongst 18-24 year olds pertaining to the lower ranks. 
These soldiers are believed to adopt more high-risk behaviours 
such  as  promiscuity,  in  addition  to  having  lower  levels  of 
education.  The  army  reported  411  accumulated  cases  of  
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HIV/AIDS in 2003.The age and ranking is a factor increasing 
vulnerability to HIV/AIDS within the FFAA. 
 
Postings 
Within  the  army  the  professional  soldiers  are  posted 
throughout  the  country  without  consideration  to  their  home 
community. Postings last for a minimum of two years and in 
the  majority  of  cases  soldiers  cannot  bring  their  families. 
Conscript  soldiers  on  the  other  hand  are  whenever  possible 
posted within their home communities as part of the “Soldados 
de mi Pueblo” initiative and serve for an average 18-24 months. 
This initiative is aimed at improving the relationship between 
the  armed  forces  and  the  civilian  population.  As  with  the 
professional soldiers, police recruits are posted without relation 
to their hometowns and postings last for a minimum of two 
years. Postings can therefore potentially increase vulnerability to 
HIV/AIDS as it leads to geographical relocations and results in 
soldiers  and  officers  spending  prolonged  periods  away  from 
their  families  –  two  important  factors  making  uniformed 
personnel particularly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. An exception 
is the police who are often able to bring their families, unless 
they are posted in high-risk isolated areas. 
 
Attitudes and behaviour 
Behaviour and attitudes within the FFAA are also found 
to be conducive to infection and transmission of HIV. FFAA 
personnel  are  paid  relatively  well  in  regards  to  their  level  of 
education, with the lowest paid ranks receiving well above the 
minimum pay. This would probably mean that members of the 
FFAA who serve in rural conflict affected areas are financially 
considerably better off than the surrounding population. This 
will  place  members  of  the  uniformed  services  at  an 
advantageous  position  over  the  local  population,  which 
facilitates  coerced  or  purchased  sex  or  sexual  relations  in 
exchange for commodities. These are practices which have been 
reported by UNAIDS to be of increasing concern in Colombia. 
In  order  to  maximise  resources  in  the  difficult 
Colombian context the role of the police and the army often 
overlap, with the police in many instances taking on the role of 
the  army  and  vice  versa.  It  is  mainly  the  police  who  have 
contact with civil society, as the military tend to be stationed 
outside the communities. A new initiative is being implemented 
within  the  FFAA,  “Acción  Integral”,  which  purpose  is  to 
increase the social work carried out by the FFAA. This includes 
construction of infrastructure and securing access for the state 
to  deliver  social  services.  The  police  have  a  Human  Rights 
Office through which it cooperates with NGOs. Relationships 
with NGOs have improved in the last couple of years and they 
are  now  viewed  as  important  partners  in  ensuring  civil  and 
human rights according to the police. Previously they were seen 
to  be  mainly  leftist  organisations  working  against  the  state. 
Nevertheless,  the  UN  and  other  human  rights  organisations 
continue  to  report  considerable  concern  over  state  violence. 
The  UN  World  Committee  Against  Torture  reports  that  the 
human rights situation and compliance with humanitarian law in 
Colombia  have  deteriorated  dramatically  since  1996. 
International  protection  organisations  have  indicated 
widespread and systematic human rights violations in Colombia. 
Even  the  USA  raised  concerns  over  human  rights  violations 
perpetrated by the state in its negotiations on the continuation 
of Plan Colombia. This includes rape, enforced disappearances 
and  murders  of  socially  marginalised  persons.  Torture  is 
systematically  used  throughout  the  national  territory  by  all 
combatant groups. This crime is most frequently committed by 
the military and police forces and by the paramilitary groups 
who  act  with  their  support,  tolerance  and  in  many  instances 
active  participation.  The  Colombian  State  has  not  taken  any 
effective measures end these violations or to guarantee human 
rights, and there is practically total impunity towards acts  of 
torture.  
Concern  has  also  been  reported  over  blockades  on 
commodities such as drugs, condoms and contraceptives, which 
civilians are allowed to bring from the municipalities into rural 
areas. The Ministry of Defence and the National Police confirm 
there are restrictions in place, but on commodities used for the 
processing  of  coca  and  that  restrictions  only  apply  to  large 
quantities  of  chemicals  and  certain  drugs,  but  also  to  some 
extent  on  condoms.  Other  organisations  claim  there  is  a 
deliberate  tactic  by  the  FFAA  to  prevent  condoms  and 
contraceptives reaching the guerrillas.                
HIV/AIDS information campaigns targeting the FFAA 
are being implemented, often as a joint collaboration with UN 
agencies.  Prevention  is  being  increasingly  recognised  by  the 
FFAA as an important factor for the reduction of HIV and as a 
more  cost  effective  strategy  than  treatment.  This  is  a  recent 
development as only five years ago HIV prevention was not 
even  considered  an  issue.  Nevertheless,  knowledge  of 
HIV/AIDS remains very low within the FFAA and there is a 
lot of discrimination towards PLWHA. Even at higher levels 
within the Ministry of Defence there is a lack of knowledge of 
what  HIV/AIDS  initiatives  are  being  conducted  within  the 
FFAA. HIV  tests are offered to members of  the FFAA but 
there  is  much  fear  and  ignorance  surrounding  the  tests  and 
many do not want to test as they fear the results. Issues include 
fear  of  losing  their  post  and  social  exclusion.  HIV/AIDS 
treatment  is  available  within  the  FFAA  but  is  mainly 
concentrated in the major towns. Healthcare provision for the 
FFAA  personnel  is  generally  poor  in  the  rural  areas  and 
HIV/AIDS  service  provision  becomes  all  but  impossible  in 
rural and conflict affected zones. HIV/AIDS is not considered 
a main preoccupation and resultantly few resources are diverted 
to the issue.  
 
8.2.2  Illegal Armed Groups 
It is almost impossible to measure HIV prevalence rate 
amongst the illegal armed forces. There are a number of reasons 
for this ranging from their clandestine nature to the prohibition 
placed on humanitarian organisations to access the illegal armed  
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groups.  Their  attitudes  and  behaviour  towards  HIV/AIDS 
makes it further unlikely to be able to survey HIV prevalence 
rates within these groups. However, looking at the variables for 
increased HIV vulnerability and the likelihood of transmitting 
the virus – age, postings, attitudes and behaviours – there are 
reasons to believe that members of the illegal armed groups in 
Colombia  have  a  heightened  vulnerability  to  HIV  and  could 
play  an  important  role  in  its  transmission  to  the  general 
population. In addition it can be argued that their structure is a 
further  variable,  although  this  is  not  part  of  the  theories  in 
section 8.1. The findings suggest some differences between the 
paramilitaries and the guerrilla. 
 
Age and level of education  
Statistics  collected  during  the  DDR  process  of  the 
guerrillas and the paramilitary show that the majority of those 
who belong to the illegal armed groups fall within age group 
most vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection. 25-34 is the age group 
reporting the majority of new infections in Colombia and within 
this  age  group  the  majority  of  demobilised  paramilitaries  are 
found.  More  than  half  of  all  new  infections  worldwide  take 
place within the age group 15-24, which is the age group where 
the majority of demobilised guerrillas were found. Low levels of 
education is another factor increasing vulnerability, within the 
paramilitary  group  only  39%  had  secondary  education  and 
within  the  guerrillas  a  mere  24%.  Amongst  both  groups  8% 
were illiterate. UNHCR reports the existence of more than 7000 
child soldiers and that the number is increasing.  
 
Table 1: socio-demographic characteristics of the illegal armed groups 
  Guerrilla groups     Paramilitaries 
Secondary  24%  Education  39% 
Primary  68%  47% 
Illiterate  8%  8% 
Married / stable relationship  34%  Civilian status  48% 
Single  65%  47% 
41 and above  3%  Age  7% 
26 – 40  28%  60% 
18 - 25   54%  33% 
Minors  15%  * 
Female  14%  Sex  7% 
Male   86%  93% 
Source: Alta Consejería para la Integración Social y Económica de ex -combates de la Presidencia. Nov 30 2006 
* The source did not report minors. However, the majority of organisations researched reported recruitment of minors by the paramilitaries.  
Structure 
The paramilitaries  
With the unification of the various paramilitary groups 
into the AUC the paramilitaries significantly strengthened their 
coercive force, and as such power over local government and 
communities  in  many  regions  in  Colombia.  As  a  unified 
organisation they became sufficiently disciplined and complex 
to place themselves within the national political arena, acquired 
a bureaucracy strong enough to govern entire regions and the 
power to name their congressmen and functionaries to central 
government. Recruitment was mostly done locally, though in 
some situations soldiers were recruited from distant societies, 
either in geographical or cultural terms. This strategy facilitated 
atrocities  and  other  human  rights  abuses  against  the 
communities they occupied as soldiers would not have any links 
or  identify  themselves  with  the  population45.  The  massacres 
were often committed by a vanguard group which would then 
recruit local people to maintain control and who would also be 
more  accepted  by  the  local  population.  The  vanguard  group 
would move on to the next village to continue to expand their 
control.  This  has  two  significant  HIV/AIDS  implications. 
Because such massacres often involved rape and sexual violence  
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committed  by  the  vanguard  group,  which  moved  from 
community to community, they became a direct transmitter of 
HIV.  Secondly  PLWHA  were  singled  out  and  assassinated. 
Whilst this could very crudely be argued to reduce transmission, 
it fuels discrimination and stigma towards PLWHA, which is a 
main factor for increasing prevalence rates. 
Interpreting the number of paramilitaries that existed is 
problematic and can affect the conclusion of the analysis. When 
the  demobilisation  process  started  in  November  2003  the 
government estimated the paramilitary had between 12,000 and 
15,000  troops.  However,  as  the  demobilisation  process 
preceded the number increased significantly. It is believed that 
many presented themselves to the process in order to access the 
benefits, without pertaining to any of the paramilitary groups or 
being only loosely linked. This affects the official statistics on 
the number of paramilitaries and the average length belonging 
to the paramilitary forces, and could also skew the statistics in 
table 1. According to OAS-MAPP there is a rather small hard 
core  group  who  participated  in  combating  the  guerrilla, 
appropriating territorial control and recruiting local people to 
the  group.  They  have  spent  an  average  5-10  years  with  the 
paramilitary.  The  larger  group  constitutes  new  recruits  who 
once the paramilitary took control over a village participated in 
maintaining control. Their time with the paramilitaries usually 
varies between 6 months to a year.  
  
FARC  
The  structure  of  FARC  is  somewhat  different.  To 
achieve their aim of overthrowing the government their army 
must be more cohesive, disciplined and formidable in combat 
than that of the paramilitaries in order to confront the national 
army  with  its  sophisticated  war  machine  and  expertise  in 
counter  insurgency.  FARC  requires  the  support  and 
coordination of all their forces to mobilise troops and resources 
amongst their different fronts, which is very different from the 
paramilitary blocks which enter in their own separate disputes. 
The guerrilla tactics results in more injuries than those of the 
paramilitaries, which is a factor increasing HIV transmission. In 
addition as the guerrillas have specialised in controlling regions 
with  scarce  infrastructure  and  poorly  integrated  commercial 
circuits, access to already limited healthcare services becomes 
more  difficult.  Monitoring  and  surveillance  of  the  actual 
HIV/AIDS situation becomes all but impossible. On the other 
hand these regions tend to be vast territories with rather low 
population density, thus providing a less fertile ground for HIV 
infection and transmission. However the conflict dynamics such 
as cultivation of illegal crops and the appropriation of land by 
the  paramilitaries  have  generated  a  large  population 
displacement towards remote regions, which has become the 
social  support  base  of  the  guerrilla46.  IDPs  are  particularly 
vulnerable to HIV infection and transmission. 
As IDPs make up 10% the population nearly every city 
is  a  host  community  to  IDPs  and  IDP  neighbourhoods  are 




The  general  lifestyle  differs  substantially  between  the 
paramilitaries and the guerrilla, with the lifestyle adopted by the 
paramilitaries  being  more  prone  to  HIV  infection  and 
transmission.  FARC  adopts  strict  living  rules,  tilted  towards 
leftist ideologies with “social living rules” interfering very much 
with  the  private  lives  of  their  combatants  and  the  villagers 
which they control. Control within their own forces extends to 
regulating sexual activity by their soldiers, which could be seen 
as  a  factor  lowering  vulnerability.  Based  mainly  in  the 
mountains healthcare is poor and living conditions are much 
more difficult than those of the paramilitaries, who are mostly 
based in villages. Although poor health is linked to an increased 
vulnerability  to  HIV  infection,  isolation  from  the  general 
population  in  addition  to  restrictions  on  sexual  relations  are 
potential reducing factors. However, what has happened is that 
the economy in guerrilla controlled areas has declined as they 
prohibit  gambling,  prostitution,  bars  etc.,  which  is  a  strong 
driving  force  in  the  Colombian  economy.  In  contrast,  the 
economy in paramilitary controlled regions has grown as they 
place  no  restrictions  on  such  economic  activities.  The 
paramilitaries  imposes  very  few  or  no  living  rules  and  pay 
salaries  to  their  recruits.  Their  combatants  are  also  based  in 
urban areas, have a greater supply of women and are granted 
leave  to  go  home  on  a  regular  basis  –  factors  identified  as 
increasing  HIV  vulnerability.  The  relaxed  living  rules  have 
resulted in many soldiers pertaining to the guerrilla switching 
side and joining the paramilitaries. Of the 35,000 demobilised 
paramilitaries it was found that 20% had been in the guerrilla 
but converted to the paramilitaries due to the difficult living 
conditions.  These  kinds  of  movements  are  also  a  potential 
factor  increasing  HIV  vulnerability  and  transmission.  In 
response to such deterioration the guerrilla is becoming more 
paramilitarised,  decreasing  the  difference  between  the  two 
forces. The guerrilla is increasingly adopting the methods of the 
paramilitaries, including entering into business with them over 
drug trafficking47. This has resulted in a loosening of the rigid 
living  rules,  which  could  potentially  increase  vulnerability  to 
HIV infection and transmission.  
Within the armed groups (FARC in particular) recruits 
are often subject to mandatory HIV testing and those who test 
positive  killed.  During  the  interviews  under  demobilisation 
processes  it  was  claimed  that  there  is  a  tactic  by  the  enemy 
group to infiltrate HIV positive women into their counterpart 
forces as a strategy to infect their enemy. This is an accusation 
that  has  been  claimed  by  both  the  paramilitaries  and  the 
guerrilla. Whilst such claims are almost impossible to verify, it 




The  level  of  intolerance  towards  HIV/AIDS  and 
homosexuality  amongst  both  the  paramilitaries  and  the  
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guerrillas  is  high.  There  is  much  stigma  and  discrimination 
surrounding  HIV/AIDS  within  the  Colombian  society  in 
general and within the illegal armed groups in particular. Both 
groups have adopted a strategy of social cleansing of PLWHA, 
which is rooted in stigma and a belief that only prostitutes and 
homosexuals have HIV, people who are not wanted by these 
groups. UNHCR reported that in field visits it was commonly 
found that HIV positive persons and homosexuals were killed, 
while sex workers were commonly taken from the street, raped 
(sometimes taken to paramilitary camps and raped for 15 days) 
and then killed. The paramilitaries often force staff in health 
centres and hospitals to divulge the results on HIV tests,  or 
they place informants within clinics in order to identify HIV 
positive  persons  who  are  then  displaced  or  assassinated.  In 
other  instances  armed  groups  subject  individuals  and 
communities  to  mandatory  testing.  Based  on  such  stigma, 
discrimination and misbelieves, the armed groups are spreading 
false  information  on  HIV/AIDS  in  the  communities  they 
control,  fuelling  discrimination  and  presenting  homosexuality 
and HIV/AIDS as diseases which need to be resolved through 
arms. In this environment it is difficult to encourage people to 
be tested knowing that the results may create more harm. The 
lack of information, education and communication campaigns 
on HIV/AIDS is also likely to increase high-risk sexual practice.  
 
Table 2: Uniformed Services and factors increasing their vulnerability to infection and transmission of HIV 
  FFAA    FARC    AUC   
Age  -Main age group: 19-24  IF  -15-24  IF  -25-34  IF 




-Highly controlled lifestyle  DF  -Vanguard group committing 
massacres 




Posting  -Without concern to their 
home communities, 
minimum 2 years 





-Mountainous and isolated 
regions 
 
DF  -Urban areas  IF 
Pay  -Relatively well paid  IF      -Paid  IF 
Behaviour  -Violence against 
communities 
-Blockages on goods 







-Strict living rules 
-Switching side 








-Lax living rules 
-Supply of prostitutes 
-Social cleansing of PLWHA 
-Violence against communities 






Attitudes  -HIV/AIDS knowledge low 




-Stigma and discrimination 
towards PLWHA 
IF  -Stigma and discrimination 
towards PLWHA 
IF 
IF: increasing factor, DF: decreasing factor 
 
 
8.3  National  Security  Threatened  by 
HIV/AIDS Affected State Institutions 
While it is difficult to see that the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
in Colombia has reached the point where functionaries in these 
institutions  are  infected  to  such  an  extent  that  the  epidemic 
threatens the effective functioning of the state, what could be 
argued is the situation in reverse. The territorial weakness of the 
central state (caused by non-HIV/AIDS related factors, beyond  
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the scope of this paper to explain) is increasing the risk of an 
accelerated HIV/AIDS epidemic. It highlights the importance 
of  prevention  in  order  to  avoid  reaching  the  stage  where 
HIV/AIDS starts to create a security vacuum and becomes an 
additional destabilising factor to national security.  
Colombia  is  a  country  with  comparatively  strong  and 
solid  institutions  at  central  level.  The  weakness  lies  in  the 
territorial reach of the government, where the state is extremely 
weak and in many instances completely absent. In these areas 
the  presence  of  illegal  armed  groups  is  strong  and  they  are 
disputing  the  state  monopoly,  including  the  monopoly  on 
armed forces. The Ministry of Defence claims that the FFAA is 
present  throughout  the  country,  though  in  the  southern  and 
western  part  of  the  country  (approximately  50%  of  the 
geographical area), and parts of the eastern coast departments 
(Chocó  and  Cauca)  their  presence  is  mainly  limited  to  the 
departmental capitals. All other sources investigated outside the 
armed forces claim that there is a total lack of state presence in 
large  parts  of  the  country,  in  particular  the  rural  conflict 
affected  zones.  Additionally  the  ICG  reports  that  in  most 
regions  it  visited  there  were  reports  of  security  forces  either 
tolerating the new armed groups and criminal gangs that have 
emerged after the demobilisation of the AUC or even actively 
working  with  them.  Most  of  the  country  is  affected  but  in 
different  ways.  The  state  tends  to  have  total  or  near  total 
control in the large and intermediate cities, while for example 
Caquetá,  Putumayo,  Meta  and  Arauca  have  seen  a  large 
presence  of  paramilitaries  the  last  15  years.  Other  regions 
profoundly  affected  are  Tumaco,  Cauca,  Valle,  Chocó,  and 
Catatumbo.  
 
Territorial state weakness   
With the AUC a new social order was imposed in many 
rural  and  semi-urban  regions  of  the  country.  The  power  of 
some of the paramilitary leaders increased to the extent that a 
new form of local state was created. Duncan terms these leaders 
as ‘warlords’ who imposed a new power relation with new ways 
of  extracting  tributes,  regulating  the  economy,  administer 
justice, bring protection, organise the provision of basic services 
and  monopolise  coercive  force48.  Any  legal  business  which 
demonstrated perspective access to competitive markets were 
subjected  to  extortion,  either  obliged  to  associate  themselves 
with the warlords or be expropriated. The territorial weakness 
of  the  state  in  these  areas  prevents  it  from  fulfilling  its 
fundamental  obligations  to  its  citizens,  such  as  healthcare 
provision  and  the  upholding  of  civil  and  human  rights.  It 
enables  the  illegal  armed  groups  to  infiltrate  the  national 
healthcare infrastructure and, being the authority administering 
justice,  the  rights  of  PLWHA  and  other  minority  groups 
becomes seriously threatened49. The power of the illegal armed 
groups enables the enforcement of their attitudes and beliefs on 
HIV/AIDS  and  acting  as  the  state  they  have  the  power  to 
prioritise issues and resource distribution, which would arguably 
disfavour  HIV/AIDS  prevention  and  treatment.  Access  by 
humanitarian  organisations  and  other  healthcare  providers  to 




Drug  trafficking  and  the  closely  related  issue  of 
corruption  are  other  destabilising  factors  in  Colombia, 
exacerbated by the territorial state weakness. In some instances 
the  national  armed  forces,  judges,  governors  and 
parliamentarians  conceal  the  violations  committed  by  the 
groups involved in the drug trade. Cultivation of illegal crops 
takes place in rural and isolated areas with limited or no state 
presence  and  thus  resultantly  limited  channels  for  the 
population  to  participate  in  legal  economic  activities. 
Cultivation  and  processing  of  coca  significantly  increases  the 
income  amongst  the  population  and  the  dynamics  of  the 
industry  has  been  found  to  produce  situations  where  a 
significant number of young men with a comparably substantial 
amount  of  money  have  little  other  stimulation  than 
consumption of drugs and women. An increase in prostitution 
(both supply and demand) has occurred, and resultantly higher 
incidents of HIV/AIDS. With no state provided social services 
there  is  an  absence  of  healthcare  services  and  risk  reducing 
programmes  targeting  prostitutes,  such  as  those  found  in 
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Figure 1: Cyclical relationship between weakened national security in Colombia and HIV/AIDS 
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8.4  Increased  vulnerability  to  HIV  infection 
in conflict and post-conflict environments 
The conflict is characterised by prolonged fighting on 
the ground, involving more soldiers and movement than short 
wars that depend on distance tactics. Casualty rates from land 
mines are amongst the highest in the world, as is the number of 
IDPs. The dysfunction of the national health system and the 
barriers  to  providing  and  accessing  services  has  led  to  a 
worsened health status of the Colombian population. 64% of 
the Colombian population live below the national poverty line50 
and  the  coping  strategies  of  the  conflict  affected  population 
many  times  lead  to  high-risk  behaviour  in  terms  of  HIV 
infection and transmission.  
  
Damage to the healthcare infrastructure 
The  main  damage  to  the  national  healthcare 
infrastructure caused by the conflict is the dysfunction of the 
healthcare system. Infiltration by the illegal armed groups into 
local government and the healthcare infrastructure has caused 
major difficulties for both the state and non-state organisation 
to  reach  the  population  with  healthcare  services.  Medical 
personnel and clients are regularly subjected to threats by the 
illegal armed groups and the confidentiality of medical records 
has become a serious problem. In addition physical damage to 
the healthcare infrastructure, such as that caused by bombing 
campaigns, has put further strain on the delivery of healthcare 
services to the conflict affected population. 
 
Infiltration by the illegal armed groups into local government and 
the healthcare infrastructure 
The issue of infiltration into the healthcare infrastructure 
by  the  illegal  armed  groups  is  a  major  preoccupation  in  the 
conflict  affected  areas.  The  municipal  mayor  and  the  local 
ministry  of  health  are  the  institutions  which  have  been 
particularly  infiltrated  in  ways  such  as  asking  for  quotas  and 
influencing contracting procedures. One way the infiltration has 
manifested itself is that many of the administrative bodies of the 
subsidised  healthcare  regime  are  now  owned  by  the 
paramilitary,  or  at  least  controlled  by  them.  With  the 
decentralisation  of  healthcare  provision  the  local  townships 
obtained considerable say over budgetary allocations and thus 
priority  setting,  which  in  many  regions  in  Colombia  has 
therefore become determined or influenced by the illegal armed 
groups. The paramilitary and the guerrilla have also been found 
to  use  the  healthcare  infrastructure  to  serve  as  their  own 
networks.  Healthcare  service  providers  are  co-opted  through 
threats  or  bribes  to  provide  healthcare  to  the  guerrillas  or 
paramilitaries,  which  has  resulted  in  the  displacement  of 
supplies  from  the  civilian  population.  In  the  Atlántico 
department alone $100 million was taken from health system by 
the  paramilitaries51.  Apart  from  the  financial  benefits, 
controlling  the  healthcare  system  is  also  highly  useful  for 
maintaining the fighting force.  
Controlling the healthcare infrastructure has resulted in 
a  lack  of  confidentiality  as  the  illegal  armed  groups  possess 
access  to  confidential  information  on  clients.  HIV  positive 
individuals have been identified in this way and been subject to 
threats,  displacements  or  disappearance.  As  such,  while  the 
general  population  can  theoretically  access  testing  services 
under the government insurance scheme the main issue with  
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VCT services is the inability to ensure confidentiality, security 
and protection of all those accessing the services. In a research 
conducted by UNHCR it was reported that in nearly every field 
visit  conducted  PLWHA  had  been  discovered,  through 
informants or by other means, and assassinated. Forced testing 
and forced disclosure of the results was also frequently cited.  
 
Barriers to access 
In  many  parts  of  the  country  the  state  is  unable  to 
deliver  healthcare  services  which  leave  many  people  without 
access. The armed groups controlling these areas decide who 
can  access  what  kind  of  services.  The  UN  and  other 
international organisations have encountered serious difficulties 
in  accessing  areas  targeted  for  healthcare  provision  including 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment initiatives or to mobilise 
people around project activities. Access to IDP communities is 
often denied or limited due to the high risk of violence or death 
for both healthcare personnel and clients. FARC has let it be 
known that international organisations are not welcome in the 
territories  they  control  in  north-eastern  Colombia  and  few 
agencies have been prepared to insist on access due to safety 
fears52.  Projects  implemented  by  national  and  international 
organisations  are  frequently  subject  to  threats  from  illegal 
armed  groups  throughout  the  country.  One  such  example  is 
Proyecto Colombia, one of the largest HIV/AIDS projects in 
Colombia implemented by the International Organisation for 
Migration  (IOM).  The  majority  of  these  threats  related  to 
providing information on HIV tests results in the communities 
and have resulted in the displacement and exile of project staff 
and  beneficiaries.  This  has  had  the  adverse  effect  of 
transforming initiatives to promote VCT, and thus improving 
public health, into risk factors. 
As  a  result  access  to  HIV/AIDS  care  and  support 
services in Colombia is very limited. For example, there is an 
acute lack of test kits, adherence to ARV has become a serious 
problem, with people not following the regime strictly and thus 
threatening  resistance  to  ARVs.  In  addition,  as  many  people 
fear the discovery of their status they may not access the care 
and support services even when available. One response to the 
problem  would  be  to  target  the  illegal  armed  groups  with 
information  and  education  on  HIV.  However,  the  Uribe 
government has prohibited the UN or any other organisation 
apart  from  the  ICRC  accessing  the  paramilitary  or  the 
guerrilla53. Although working with these groups on HIV/AIDS 
education and prevention as well as other human rights issues 
could  be  an  effective  way  to  counteract  the  aforementioned 
problems, it could also risk providing certain legitimacy to these 
groups. 
 
Dysfunction of monitoring and surveillance systems 
In many parts of the country there is a complete lack of 
surveillance  of  public  health,  including  monitoring  of 
HIV/AIDS. Reporting is serious problem in conflict affected 
zones,  complicated  further  by  the  lack  of  confidentiality. 
HIV/AIDS surveillance and monitoring is of utmost important 
for  targeted  prevention  and  treatment  strategies  to  combat 
HIV/AIDS  and  measuring  the  success  of  strategies  and 
programmes.  The  above  mentioned  barriers  to  access  to 
healthcare  services  may  be  a  significant  factor  in  the 
underreporting of HIV, as people are unable or unwilling to 
access VCT services. As such, the statistics that indicate that 
HIV/AIDS is mainly a problem in urban areas may be skewed 
as the conflict is taking place mainly in rural areas. As most 
existing  VCT  and  treatment  services  are  found  in  the  larger 
cities,  which  also  have  better  reporting  mechanisms,  the 
reported HIV/AIDS situation in Colombia might be distorted. 
There is also the risk that AIDS deaths are recorded by the 
opportunistic infection rather than the presence of the virus. 
 
Changed behaviour of conflict affected people 
Coping strategies 
Loyalty towards a paramilitary or guerrilla leader is often 
demanded  in  the  areas  they  control  and  the  community  is 
obliged  to  fulfil  certain  rules.  This  includes  paying  taxes, 
informing on rivalling armed groups, renouncing any kind of 
collaboration with such groups and respecting the formal and 
informal  norms  and  regulations  imposed  by  the  leaders.  In 
return citizens will receive protection from extortion, crime and 
physical violence from other armed groups, provision of justice 
and access to public services such as healthcare54. Access to 
healthcare  services  thus  becomes  conditional  on  cooperation 
with the illegal armed groups, which through this system are 
also supplied with informants on PLWHA. These conditions 
have  generated  a  level  of  tolerance  within  the  community 
towards  crimes  committed  against  PLWHA  and  other 
minorities. Another coping strategy reported by UNAIDS to be 
of increasing concern is the rise in sex in exchange for money 
or food or for access to social benefits. UNCHR has reported 
that young girls, in order to ensure their survival and wellbeing 
and  that  of  their  family,  purposely  become  pregnant  by 
paramilitary  leaders.  Relationships  between  young  girls  and 
older and powerful paramilitaries are common and is a factors 
making young women particularly vulnerable to HIV. 
 
High-risk behaviour 
Promiscuity and prostitution is widespread in Colombia 
and is particularly rampant in rural areas. While this can partly 
be explained by the social structure of the Colombian society it 
is also a result of the lack of opportunities and the short-term 
life perspective felt by many as a result of the conflict. There is 
a  high  level  of  uncertainty  towards  the  future  amongst  the 
Colombian  population  as  they  harbour  a  real  fear  of  armed 
groups entering their villages and either massacre, displace or 
forcefully recruit them. This is believed to lead to increases in 
sexual  activity,  often  with  prostitutes,  and  an  rise  in  women 
turning to transactional sex for survival. There exists a strong  
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machismo culture, in particular in the countryside, which has 
resulted in the common practice that men will have children 
with a number of women and the children of one woman are 
likely to all have different fathers. UNHCR has reported high 
rates  of  trafficking  of  young  women  for  the  sex  industry, 
including  trafficking  to  Panama,  Europe  and  the  USA.  The 
Health Secretariat reported that many return HIV positive and 
continue to sell sex on their return. It was also reported that 
families highly value the money their daughters can earn abroad 
and many saw this as an only option for the young women out 
of poverty. This was a problem particularly found in Valle de 
Cauca. 
According  to  the  Demographic  Health  Survey 
knowledge  of  HIV/AIDS  is  high  in  Colombia,  including  in 
rural areas. What is less known is the right to VCT services as 
part  of  the  national  health  insurance.  However  condom  use 
continues to be insufficient and is particularly low amongst sex 
workers and their customers. In a study carried out in Bogotá in 
2001 reported by the UNHCR amongst sex workers and their 
customers, 41% of the women reported that they rarely used 
condoms,  the  main  reason  being  the  offer  of  more  money 
(72%).  61%  of  the  customers  reported  that  they  never  used 
condoms;  75%  responded  that  they  sometimes  paid  to  have 
sexual  relationships  without  condom;  and  69%  did  not  use 
condoms when under the influence of psychoactive substances.  
 
Sexual violence 
According  to  the  UN  World  Organisation  Against 
Torture  sexual  violence  is  common  in  Colombia.  Rapes  are 
rarely reported, confirmed both by human rights organisations 
and the police. The crime is perpetrated by the illegal armed 
groups and the FFAA alike. UNHCR reported that rape and 
gender based violence were common occurrences in all areas 
researched, with many women and girls not reporting the rape 
or  being  killed  after  being  raped.  While  post-exposure 
prophylaxis  is  available  in  certain  areas  and  within  some 
programmes, women often do not attend clinics post-rape due 
to stigma and shame and do therefore not access prophylaxis 
services. It was found that in some areas many young women 
after being raped preferred to access emergency contraceptives 
at  a  pharmacy  as  this  was  seen  as  more  confidential  than 
reporting the rape and receiving counselling at a government 
hospital.  
 
Refugees and IDPs 
Government estimates there are between 2 and 3 million 
IDPs in Colombia  though  only 1.6 million are registered. In 
surrounding countries more than half a million Colombians live 
in refugee-like situations. NGO figures suggest the presence of 
more than 3.4 million IDPs. This means that up to 1.8 million 
IDPs  are  without  any  access  to  healthcare  services.  In  an 
investigation made by WHO in 2002 -200355 in 6 of the largest 
municipalities  targeting  IDPs  it  was  found  that  only  24%  of 
IDPs and 34% of the host population living in the poorer areas 
were  affiliated  to  one  of  the  state  health  insurance  schemes. 
This  is  well  below  national  average  for  both  groups. 
Approximately 20% of IDPs and 30% of host populations did 
not possess any kind of document to access healthcare services 
and only 23% of those with symptoms or illness sought medical 
assistance. 10% of IDPs who sought medical assistance were 
denied, in comparison to 2% amongst the host populations. It 
was found that HIV amongst IDP populations is not a priority 
issue and there exist very limited data on HIV/AIDS for this 
group.    
Repatriation  of  IDPs  has  been  prevented  by  the 
continued violence. It is also limited due to the long time that 
many of the victims have been displaced, often between 10-15 
years. Many have formed new lives in the towns where they 
forcedly migrated to and do no longer consider themselves as 
displaced. This would potentially reduce the likelihood of the 
spread of HIV caused by population movements. On the other 
hand,  being  non-camp  based  (Colombia  does  not  have  any 
organised IDP camps, which are often established in other IDP 
affected countries) is a potential factor increasing vulnerability. 
IDP camps reduce privacy and thus sexual activity, and facilitate 
access by humanitarian organisations. 
 
Wartime policies and priorities 
Healthcare policy 
There has been a rather stable financial investment in 
the national health system, although more resources are needed 
to  implement  the  National  Health  Plan  and  state  health 
insurance  scheme.  Regarding  HIV/AIDS  the  government  is 
focusing on improving information and quality and there has 
been  some  important  investments  made.  Nevertheless, 
insufficient  allocation  of  human  and  financial  resources 
continues  to  be  the  main  barriers  to  implementations  of 
HIV/AIDS  policies  and  strategies,  rooted  in  the  low 
prioritisation  of  HIV.  Corruption  and  the  infiltration  by  the 
illegal  armed  groups  in  local  government  and  the  healthcare 
infrastructure have led to the distortion of the funds allocated.  
 
Classifying the conflict as terrorism 
Classifying  the  conflict  as  terrorism  and  criminality  is 
seen by many as a smokescreen to divert public attention from 
the  real  issues  underlying  the  social  turmoil.  This  include 
widespread  poverty  and  lack  of  economic  opportunities,  the 
disenfranchisement of those living in impoverished and rural 
areas, and the failure of the state to deliver social programs and 
act as a force for order and accountability56. It causes further 
obstacles  to  the  displaced  population  as  in  many  areas  in 
Colombia  they  are  unable  to  register  as  IDPs  because  the 
government  does  not  officially  recognise  displacement  when 
caused  by  the  narco-conflict.  The  displacement  and 
assassination of PLWHA by the illegal armed groups has not  
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been considered a main issue by the government or by many of 
the international organisations working with the government to 
resolve the conflict.  
 
The post-conflict environment 
There have been several attempts to resolve the conflict 
and peace negotiations have been held with a number of the 
actors to the conflict. There is an ongoing DDR process with 
the  AUC,  negotiations  on  a  humanitarian  agreement  with 
FARC  and  peace  talks  are  being  conducted  between  the 
government and the ELN guerrilla group. In the last decade 




Although  international  presence  relating  to  the  peace 
negotiations in Colombia is fairly recent, it is significant. In the 
peace negations held with FARC and the Pastrana government 
in 1998 some 20 countries were present in addition to the UN. 
In the current demobilisation process the OAS-MAPP holds an 
important position and has enabled the involvement of further 
international actors. Foreign governments such as Sweden and 
Holland play a crucial role. The peace negotiations with ELN 
currently  being  held  in  Cuba  includes  the  ‘group  of  friendly 
countries’ consisting of 7 different countries. More difficult and 
less  formalised  are  the  negotiations  being  conducted  with 
FARC on a humanitarian agreement, which is led by France, 
Spain  and  Switzerland,  and  more  recently  includes  the 
participation of Venezuela. The UN has significant presence in 
Colombia,  with  21  of  its  agencies  working  in  many  of  the 
country’s regions. Whilst the agencies employ many local staff 
there is a considerable number of international staff contracted. 
The  research  conducted  found  no  indications  that  this  is 
threatening an increase in HIV.  
 
The demobilisation process 
There  are  several  components  within  the  peace 
negotiations and demobilisation process which could impact on 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
 
The Santa Fe Ralito Accords 
During the talks leading up to the peace agreement with 
the  AUC  in  Santa  Fe  Ralito  there  was  a  concentration  of 
military personnel, AUC combatants, government officials and 
other influential people, and significantly an influx of money. 
As a result both demand and supply of prostitutes increased, 
with  sex  workers  arriving  from  many  different  parts  of  the 
country.  The  sex  workers  were  mainly  poor  youth  with  low 
levels of education. As part of the conditions for the peace talks 
the paramilitaries were enclosed in large ranches protected by 
the police in order to negotiate with the government without 
being attacked by the guerrilla. However, police protection was 
rather  porous  in  the  sense  that  it  permitted  young  girls  and 
professional prostitutes being buss-loaded into the premises and 
brothels were established surrounding the ranches. There was 
also  a  demand  by  the  paramilitaries  for  virgin  girls  to  be 
supplied. The WHO has reported an increase in STI and HIV 
rates in the region following the Santa Fe Ralito Accords. 
 
Reintegration 
The  demobilisation  programme  includes  components 
pertaining to ethics and morale and how to live and interact 
with civil society. This is deemed important due to the crimes 
that  many  of  the  former  combatants  committed  against  the 
civilian  population.  There  is  also  a  healthcare  component, 
which includes psychosocial treatment and VCT. Nevertheless 
shortcomings in the programme include insufficient resources 
(e.g.  only  1  healthcare  professional  per  5,000  demobilised 
combatants,  and  1  psychologist  per  120.  The  WHO 
recommends a minimum of 2.5 healthcare workers per 1000 
people  under  normal  circumstances).  It  was  also  found  that 
sexual violence increased during this period. In addition there 
have been no efforts to sensitise civil society on what is meant 
by  the  DDR  process,  which  has  resulted  in  high  levels  of 
discrimination  against  returning  ex-combatants.  Many  ex-
combatants  were  therefore  transferred  to  the  larger  cities, 
mainly  Bogotá,  to  better  guarantee  their  security.  In  the 
beginning  of  the  demobilisation  programme  many  former 
combatants did return to their home communities. Though as 
the programme proceeded this number decreased as a result of 
the  discrimination  they  faced  in  their  home  communities.  A 
large  part  of  the  ex-combatants  who  did  not  return  to  their 
home  communities  have  turned  to  co-operations  or 
associations of former paramilitaries in order to be with their 
peers. Some have returned to the paramilitary groups and their 
successors. The failure to properly reintegrate the demobilised 
combatants  into  society,  in  addition  to  the  shortcomings  in 
sustainable  behaviour  change  activities,  could  risk  that  they 
continue  to  harbour  the  attitudes  and  behaviours  found  to 
increase the risk of HIV infection and transmission. However, 
the argument that DDR processes lead to large-scale population 
movements has not been the case in Colombia, neither with the 
AUC  demobilisation  nor  with  the  previous  demobilisation 




Figure 2: Increased vulnerability to HIV/AIDS in conflict and post
 
 
8.5  Obstacles to peace building 
There  appears  to  be  little  evidence  pointing  towards 
HIV/AIDS being an obstacle to peace building, in the sense 
that it becomes a disincentive to end conflict or an obstacle to 
the reconstruction of national security. However, the increasing 
HIV  prevalence  rate  merits  a  discussion  on  the  issue. 
Prevalence  is  increasing  most  rapidly  amongst  vulnerabl
groups, to which the uniformed personnel and the illegal armed 
groups  pertain.  The  risk  exist  that  HIV  rates  increases 
dramatically within these groups and could as such become a 
potential obstacle to peace building, which has been found to 
have  happened  in  other  high-prevalence  conflict  affected 
countries. The same could be argued for the theory HIV/AIDS 
as an obstacle to the reconstruction of national security. The 
state institutions important to maintaining national security do 
not  appear  to  be  threatened  by  the  impact  of  HIV/AIDS, 
though  as  shown  in  section  8.3  factors  accelerating  the 
HIV/AIDS  epidemic  are  present.  In  addition,  the  Santa  Fe 
Ralito process has demonstrated how peace negotiations and 
initiatives  can  increase  HIV  transmission.  This  point
importance  of  early  preventing  to  avoid  creating  additional 
obstacles to achieving peace in Colombia.  
 
Reduced  willingness  by  states  to  provide  or  receive 
peacekeepers 
Research  did  not  indicate  the  deployment  of 
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the possibility of the arrival of blue helmets to maintain peace
The seriousness of this statement can be questioned given the 
denial by the government of an armed conflict in Colombia. 
However, with the various negotiations c
between the government and the illegal armed groups, a peace 
agreement  could  be  reached  which  would  include  UN  or 
regional peacekeepers or peace observers. One example is the 
peace  talks  presently  being  conducted  with  ELN  in  Cuba, 
where  demands  by  the  ELN  include  a  stronger  verification 
mandate  and  increased  international  presence.  This  would 
involve more international observers. It is not clear yet who will 
fill this mandate, whether the UN, OAS, EU, or the Group of 
Friendly Countries, etc. If this becomes a reality the issue of 
HIV/AIDS  should  not  be  ignored  given  the  fact  that  Latin 
America and the Caribbean is the second most affected region 
by HIV/AIDS. 
The various peace negotiations have involved significant 
international presence and there appears to be a general belief 
that international presence will increase in the next five years. 
This  was  viewed  as  a  positive  development  by  many 
organisations and not seen as threatening an increase in HIV 
infection. 
 
8.6  Effects on the Provi
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Humanitarian  organisations  play  an  important  role  in 
working with the conflict affected population in Colombia and 
are  significant  providers  of  HIV/AIDS  prevention  and 
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treatment  programmes.  21  UN  agencies  are  present  in 
Colombia.  IOM,  UNAIDS,  UNFPA,  WHO,  UNICEF, 
UNHCR, WFP, ICRC and MSF are the main agencies working 
with  HIV/AIDS  related  issues.  However,  the  conflict  and 
government policies are causing major obstacles to the effective 
provision of humanitarian assistance, including the provision of 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment services to some of the 
most vulnerable populations in Colombia.  
 
Working environment 
Colombia  presents  a  particularly  difficult  working 
environment  for  the  provision  of  humanitarian  assistance, 
ranging from the views held by the government to the threats 
by the illegal armed groups. President Uribe has expressed on a 
number  of  occasions  that  human  rights  groups  are  FARC 
sympathisers.  These  statements  were  widely  seen  by 
humanitarian organisations as providing a license for right-wing 
armed  actors  to  harass  and  kill  activists.  In  particular  Uribe 
spoke  of  human  rights  groups  as  “serving  terrorism”  and 
referred  to  donor  governments  as  sponsors  or  defenders  of 
terrorists58. Nevertheless there is an increasing recognition by 
the state of the important role these groups play in providing 
life saving services to the conflict affected population, with a 
resultant increase in collaboration and coordination. The illegal 
armed  groups  have  also  on  many  occasions  expressed  their 
intolerance towards aid personnel. FARC accuses aid personnel 
active  in  paramilitary-controlled  areas  of  promoting  their 
adversary’s  cause,  and  the  reverse  was  true  for  the 
paramilitaries.  In  one  incident  several  human  rights  workers 
kidnapped by FARC for activities on behalf of people in areas 
controlled  by  paramilitaries  were,  following  their  release, 
detained  by  the  paramilitaries  on  suspicion  of  being  FARC 
sympathies.59  
The impacts on humanitarian organisations has included 
a reduced profile and outreach and in some areas suspension of 
programs  altogether.  As  of  March  2006,  eight  of  the  32 
provinces  had  been  closed  to  humanitarian  operations  for 
security  reasons60.  Promotion  of  human  rights,  such  as  the 
rights  of  PLWHA,  continues  to  be  high-risk  activities  with 
human  rights  activists  regularly  targeted  by  the  illegal  armed 
groups  and  assassinated.  An  additional  problem  faced  by 
humanitarian agencies is the fluidity of the Colombian conflict. 
With  the  geographical  focus  areas  constantly  moving, 
implementing  HIV/AIDS  prevention  and  treatment 
programmes becomes difficult.  
 
Implications of HIV/AIDS projects 
Whilst  the  projects  implemented  by  humanitarian 
agencies  in  conflict  affected  areas  offer  important  access  to 
lifesaving  services,  several  agencies  have  reported  adverse 
effects  of  particular  concern.  Due  to  the  discrimination  and 
human rights abuses suffered by PLWHA, promoting VCT has 
placed both clients and service providers at an increased risk to 
violence and death by the illegal armed groups. The same holds 
true for PLWHA accessing treatment services. Project staff are 
repeatedly threatened and asked to provide information on the 
people accessing the services provided by the projects. Another 
problem encountered by amongst others IOM, results from the 
organisation of youth into projects. The illegal armed groups 
have been found to approach youth groups organised by the 
projects and forced to join their group.  
 
9.  CONCLUSION 
 
The  paper  has  studied  whether  in  the  light  of  the 
increasing international recognition of HIV/AIDS as a threat to 
national  security,  Should  HIV/AIDS  be  securitized?  If  so,  what 
would be the consequences to humanitarian assistance? The purpose of 
securitizing HIV/AIDS would be two-fold. It would contribute 
to  peace  and  security  by  preventing  HIV/AIDS  becoming  a 
reason  for  conflict,  and  secondly  it  would  contribute  to  the 
global efforts to halt and reverse the HIV/AIDS epidemic by 
preventing that conflict situations exacerbate the spread of the 
epidemic. Based on the evidence found in Colombia and on 
previous  research  by  other  authors,  HIV/AIDS  should  be 
considered  as  a  security  issue.  The  four  theories  linking 
HIV/AIDS, conflict and national security appear to hold true 
even in countries with comparably low prevalence rates, though 
their significance will vary from case to case. This point to the 
importance  of  targeted  responses  on  a  case  to  case  basis, 
founded on empirical evidence. A targeted response based on 
case specific evidence becomes difficult however, due to the 
problems with functioning and reliable surveillance mechanisms 
and  the  lack  of  monitoring  and  evaluations  of  HIV/AIDS 
initiatives in conflict contexts.  
The thesis reaches two conclusions:  
With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1308, 
and the subsequent international declarations on HIV/AIDS, 
HIV/AIDS has already been securitized at international level. 
Based  on  the  scale  of  the  HIV/AIDS  pandemic,  its  cross-
sectoral impact and impact on issues which falls under both the 
wider  and  narrow  security  definition,  the  declaration  of 
HIV/AIDS as a threat to national and international security is 
arguably justified. Declaring HIV/AIDS as a threat to national 
and  international  security  should  increase  the  attention  and 
focus on HIV/AIDS, and strengthen a multisector approach, 
which  is  of  crucial  importance  for  halting  and  reversing  the 
epidemic.  The  recognition  that  HIV/AIDS  is  a  threat  to 
national  and  international  security  through  the  demonstrated 
linkages  between  HIV/AIDS,  conflict  and  national  security, 
should force governments into action and at the same time give 
power to the international community to ensure governments 
are providing necessary care and treatment services. It should 
help  mobilise  resources,  increase  the  availability  and 
affordability  of  ARVs  by  overriding  patient  laws  and  thus 
permitting the production of cheaper generic ARVs, as part of  
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the extraordinary measures available when fighting a declared 
threat to national and/or international security. 
Considered as a factor that can exacerbate conflict and 
provide  an  obstacle  to  peace building  HIV/AIDS  should  be 
included as a security concept in conflict resolution. Resultantly 
it  should  be  applied  as  a  variable  in  conflict  analysis  and 
integrated into DDR programmes. This would put pressure on 
national governments in conflict affected countries to seriously 
consider  the  issue  of  HIV/AIDS,  which  has  been  found  to 
often be ignored or de-prioritised in such settings. HIV/AIDS 
is  already  high  on  the  agenda  amongst  humanitarian 
organisations,  including  the  UN,  but  securitization  would 
further  broaden  the  multi-sector  approach  and  the  themes 
which  HIV/AIDS  crosscut.  It  should  lead  to  an  increase  in 
resources committed as donor governments and agencies move 
HIV/AIDS further up the priority agenda. In addition, further 
attention would be given to other closely related issues, such as 
sexual and reproductive health, which is of utmost importance 
for the prevention of HIV/AIDS though often given very little 
attention and subsequently largely under-funded, in particular in 
conflict  environments.  Care  need  to  be  taken  however,  to 
ensure that any increased resources for HIV/AIDS is a result of 
an  increase  in  governments  and  donor  agencies’  funding 
commitments  and  not  a  diversion  of  funds  from  other 
important development themes.   
The  answer  becomes  more  complex  when  looking  at 
whether  national  governments  should  securitize  HIV/AIDS. 
What is clear is that there is a need for case specific responses, 
as  the  strength  of  the  theories  will  vary  depending  on  the 
specific  context.  Whereas  in  some  countries  the  validity  of 
securitizing HIV/AIDS may be more obvious, presumably in 
countries with a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate experiencing 
prolonged conflict, in other cases, politicising HIV/AIDS may 
be more appropriate than securitizing the issue.  
In  Colombia  evidence  was  found  to  support  all  four 
theories,  though  their  strength  varied.  The  theories  uniformed 
personnel as a vector of HIV, and increased vulnerability to HIV/AIDS 
in  conflict  environments  demonstrated  the  strongest  linkages 
between  HIV/AIDS,  national  security  and  conflict.  The 
relatively low HIV prevalence rate made the theories national 
security  threatened  by  HIV/AIDS  affected  state  institutions,  and 
HIV/AIDS  as  an  obstacle  to  peace  building,  less  of  an  issue. 
However both theories were demonstrated in reverse, i.e. that a 
weakened state and peace building initiatives could contribute 
the spread of HIV/AIDS, thus the link is definitely present. 
What was clear in the Colombian case was the role played by 
the  illegal  armed  groups  in  the  spread  of  the  HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, and that the conflict environment is contributing to 
the  increased  spread  of  HIV.  This  triggers  the  question  of 
where the response should lie and the more difficult issue of 
how to deal with these groups. If HIV/AIDS was securitized by 
the Uribe government, the response would risk being shifted to 
state institutions which have proven to be highly undemocratic 
and  non-transparent,  as  well  as  repeatedly  condemned  for 
human rights violations. It would bring the issue of HIV/AIDS 
into the framework of the democratic and security policy, under 
which Uribe has already claimed that human and civil rights are 
obstacles to defeating the illegal armed groups. It would risk the 
mis-use  of  resources  earmarked  for  HIV/AIDS,  or  the 
diversion  of  the  resources  to  the  security  and  state  elite 
echelons,  on  the  expense  of  services  provided  to  the  civil 
population. Also with the war policies of the government, it 
would be highly unlikely that the illegal armed groups would be 
included in the response. There is discrimination between how 
the  government  treats  the  illegal  armed  groups.  Doubts  are 
reported on the effectiveness of the FFAA in regaining control 
over the territories previously controlled by the AUC, as well as 
their commitment to fighting the new armed groups emerging 
after the demobilisation of the AUC. FARC is the main object 
of  the  military  strategy  and  frequently  the  FFAA  has  been 
reported  to  turn  a  blind  eye  towards  the  AUC  successors. 
Securitizing  HIV/AIDS,  i.e.  presenting  HIV/AIDS  as  a 
security issue would in the Colombian context most likely lead 
to  further  stigmatisation  of  HIV  positive  people,  if  an  all-
inclusive sector-wide approach is not taken.  
As  for  the  issue  of  how  to  deal  with  illegal  armed 
groups, both FARC and the paramilitaries have been declared 
terrorist  groups  by  the  national  government  and  part  of  the 
international  community  (e.g.  the  European  Union  and  the 
USA). The Uribe government has prohibited any organisation, 
including the UN, from dealing with these groups. However, to 
prevent  that  HIV/AIDS  further  negatively  affects  the 
Colombian  conflict  as  well  as  preventing  that  the  conflict 
further  exacerbates  the  HIV/AIDS  epidemic,  any  response 
must  target  the  illegal  armed  groups.  What  is  needed  is  an 
attitude  and  behaviour  change  around  HIV/AIDS,  access  to 
prevention  and  treatment  services,  the  guaranteeing  of  the 
rights  pertaining  to  PLWHA  and  functioning  and  reliable 
monitoring and surveillance mechanisms. If the conflict is not 
resolved,  and  thus  local  state  institutions  continue  to  be 
infiltrated by the illegal armed groups and the central state is 
unable to regain full territorial control, securitizing HIV/AIDS 
could permit the UN and humanitarian organisations to provide 
these  essential  life  saving  services  to  the  conflict  affected 
populations. It would also give the government an opportunity 
to seek the assistance of the international community without 
declaring  a  civil  war  or  changing  its  war  policies.  However, 
conferring  the  response  to  the  non-state  sector  and 
international  agencies  and  organisations  would  relieve  the 
government from its responsibility to provide basic services to 
its populations, and makes the response to HIV/AIDS subject 
to the goodwill of such agencies. What is tremendously clear in 
the  fight  against  HIV/AIDS  is  the  need  for  a  multisectoral 
approach. 
As such, politicisation might be more appropriate in the 
Colombian context. There is a strong need to view HIV/AIDS 
as a wider security issue and not just a public health issue in 
Colombia. HIV/AIDS impacts negatively on the conflict, and 
the conflict has a negative impact on the HIV epidemic and 
prevention is urgently required to avoid that this  situation is 
exacerbated. Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that HIV/AIDS 
on its own poses a threat to national security in Colombia. By 
politicising HIV/AIDS the government would acknowledge the 
two-way  cause  and  effect  relationship  between  HIV/AIDS, 
national security and conflict, thus prevention would become an  
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issue not only for public health purposes, but also for resolving 
the conflict. This however raises the question of what would 
trigger Uribe to politicise HIV/AIDS? This particularly so in 
the light of a dysfunctional monitoring and surveillance system 
and with the government’s stance on civil and human rights. 
HIV prevalence rate is estimated to reach 1.5% in 2015, more 
than  doubling  within  9  years.  Moreover  the  official  HIV 
prevalence rate 0.7%, could potentially be underestimated as in 
the  rural  conflict  affected  areas  accessing  VCT  is  seriously 
hindered,  and  reporting  a  problematic  issue.  Not  only 
healthcare  providers  and  human  rights  activists  face  serious 
difficulties  in  reporting,  journalists  also  suffer  serious  threats 
and attacks from both the illegal armed groups and the state. 
Due to such intimidation many journalist refrain from travelling 
to  certain  areas,  preferring  to  report  only  official  figures. 
Intimidation  of  humanitarian  groups  and  journalists  deprives 
the  public  of  an  understanding  of  what  is  taking  place. 
Underestimating  both  the  actual  and  future  scale  of  the 
HIV/AIDS  epidemic  could  be  a  further  cause  for  the 
government  to  de-prioritise  the  issue  and  continue  to  view 
HIV/AIDS  as  a  public  health  issue  only  and  the  resulting 
apathy  by  the  public  towards  the  issue.  If  securitized  at 
international  level  and  adopted  in  conflict  resolution 
mechanisms,  the  pressure  to  give  a  higher  priority  to 
HIV/AIDS in conflict settings would come from the outside 
when such pressure proves difficult to provide from within the 
country. 
HIV/AIDS  does  not  on  its  own  cause  wars,  neither 
does armed conflict directly generate HIV/AIDS. However, the 
structural  damage  HIV/AIDS  is  able  to  inflict  can  have  a 
profound effect on national security and the presence of armed 
conflict can exacerbate in vulnerable societies those factors that 
could lead to greater incidence of HIV transmission. There is an 
uncertainty whether HIV rates have yet reached their peak, with 
some  taking  the  view  that  rates  peaked  in  the  1990s  while 
others believe that it is possible that the epidemic is still at an 
early state61. In both cases, deaths from AIDS have yet to reach 
their peak. As such, the 21st century may offer a test to the 
correlation  between  high  HIV/AIDS  prevalence  rate  and 
destabilisation and civil conflict. 
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